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AUTHOR: 


COLVIN,  STEPHEN 


TITLE: 


SCHOPENHAUER'S 
DOCTRINE... 

PLACE: 

PROVIDENCE,  R.  I. 

DA  TE : 

1897 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSriT  LIBRARIES 
['RESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 


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WORLD  OF  FIIEXOMEXA 


INAUGURAL  DISSERTATION  FOR  THE  ACQUISITION    OF    THE    DOCTOR'S    DEGKEK    1  RuM 

THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  FACULTY    OF  THE  KAISKR-WILHELMS-UNIV- 

ERSITY  OF    STRASSBURG  IN  ALSACE. 


PRESENTED  BY 

STiiPHEN    SHELDON     COLVIN. 


PKi.'\-IDENCE,    K.   r. 

•j  i  i  F.     1 '  R  A  N  K  L I K      F  K  i :  J^  S . 


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Accepted  by  the  Philosophical  Faculty,  May  15,  1897. 


PROK.   W.    G.    KVERETT T, 


WITH 


KSTB^eM   A^ND  QRATITUDK. 


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,1 


/ 


/ 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER   1. 


THE  WORLDS  OF  BEING  AND  OF  BECOMING. 

§  1.  Schopenhauer  recognizes  the  necessity  of  their 
union,  a  union   which  is  made  difficult  by  his  ei)istenK)k)gy. 

§  2.  Possil)le  modes  of  rehition  as  set  forth  in  Scho})en- 
hauer's  doctor's  dissertation. — The  causal  and  the  teleok)gi- 
cal  notions. 

§  3.  The  nature  of  the  thing-in-itself  and  of  phenomena 
as  expounded  by  Scho[)enhauer. 

CHAPTER  n. 

ATTEMPT    TO    JOIN    PHENOMENA    WITH    NOUMENA,    PROCEEDING 

FROM     THE     FORMER. 

§  4.     Schopenhauer's  epistemology  in  relation  to  Kant's 


^'mven. 


M 


§  5.      Method  of  reaching  and  determining  the  nature  of 


the  will. 


CHAPTER   HI 


ATTEMPT  TO  JOIN  NOUMENA    WITH    PHENOMENA    BY  FINDINCr  IN 
THE  FORMER  A  POSITIVE  PRINCIPLE  FOR  THEIR  CONNECTION. 

§  6.     The  doctrine  of  parallelism.  — Spinoza's  philosophy. 

§  7.  The  doctrine  of  the  empirical  and  the  intelligible 
character.  — Kant' s  philosophy. 

§  8.  The  doctrine  of  the  idea  and  its  copy. — Plato's 
philosophy. 

§  9.  The  doctrine  of  immanence. — Aristotle's  phil- 
osophy. 


\ 


/ 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  TELEOLOGICAL    PHASE  OF  SCHOPENHAUEr's  DOCTRINE. 

§  10.      Its    connection    with   the    transcendental    side    of 
Aristotle's  system. 

ft. 

§  11.      Its   relation  to   Fichte's  philosophy  and  Neo-Pla- 
tonic  mysticism. 

^12.      Schopenhauer's  system    yiewed  as  an   ethical  and 
religious  philosophy. 


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.  CHAPTER  !. 

THE    WORLDS  OF   BEING  AND  BECOMING. 

WHEN  Greek  philosophy  with  the  intuitive  insight 
of    fresh   awaking  genius    first  developed    the 
antithesis  of  the  worlds  of  Being  and  Becoming 
it  raised  a  })robleni  whose  solution  was  to  busy  the  speculative 
thinking  of  the  ages  to  come.      The  relation  between  these  two 
worlds,  the  bond  of   union   which   joins  the  ceaseless  flux  of 
j)henomenal  existence  to  the  eternal  changeless  essence — this 
has  furnished  material  for  an  inquiry  of  the  greatest  profund- 
ity, an  inquiry  which  the  schools  and  systems  of  Antiquity, 
the  disputations  of  the  Middle  Ages  and  the  metaphysics  of 
Modern  Times  have  continually  sought  to  answer.     True, 
some  sceptical  of  human  attainment  have    been    content    to 
limit  knowledge  to  the  workl  of  experience,    while    others 
with  dogmatic  assurance   have   in  their   eager   search    after 
ultimate  reality  left  far  behind  the  realm  of  phenomena,  thus 
forgetting  the  source  and  aim  of  their  inquiries;  but  neither 
sceptic  nor  dogmatist  can  be  said  to  have  achieved  results  of 
a  permanent  character.      The  human  mind  can  never  content 
itself  with  a  phenomenal  world  which  contains  in  itself  no 
abiding    reality.       Equally    unsatisfactory    is    the  realm  of 
transcendent  shadows  where  abstract  concepts  without  flesh 
and  blood  elude  the  grasp  of  the  seeker  after  truth.      The 
worlds  of  Being  and  of  Becoming  both  have  their  worth  and 
'their  justification  but  neither  alone  can  be  said  to  have  true 
meaning  or  existence.     No  philosopher  has  recognized  more 
clearly  than  Schopenhauer  the  necessity  of  an  intimate  rela- 
tion between  these  two  worlds.      His  entire  system,  from  one 
point  of  view  at  least,    may  properly  be  considered  as   an 
explanation  of  the  physical  universe  through  super  physical 
concepts.      For    him    metaphysics    is  the    interpretation  of 
experience,  and  a  transcendental    hypothesis  is  valid  only  in 


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CHAPTER  I. 


THE    WORLDS  OF    BEING  AND  BECOMING. 


I. 


W 


HEN  Greek  philosophy  with  the  intuitive  insight 
of    fresh   awaking  genius    first  developed    the 
antithesis  of  the  workls  of  Being:  and  Becoming 
it  raised  a  problem  whose  sohition  was  to  busy  the  speculative 
thinking  of  the  ages  to  come.      The  relation  between  these  two 
worlds,  the  bond  of   union   which   joins  the  ceaseless  flux  of 
phenomenal  existence  to  the  eternal  changeless  essence — this 
has  furnished  material  for  an  inquiry  of  the  greatest  profund- 
ity, an  inquiry  which  the  schools  and  systems  of  Antiquity, 
the  disputations  of  the  Middle  Ages  and   the  metaphysics  of 
Modern  Times  have  continually  sought   to   answer.      True, 
some  sceptical  of  human  attainment  have    been    content    to 
limit  knowledge  to  the  worki  of  experience,    w^hile   others 
with  dogmatic  assurance   have   in  their   eager   search    after 
ultimate  reality  left  far  behind  the  realm  of  phenomena,  thus 
forgetting  the  source  and  aim  of  their  inquiries;  but  neither 
sceptic  nor  dogmatist  can  be  said  to  have  achieved  results  of 
a  permanent  character.      The  human  mind  can  never  content 
itself  with  a  phenomenal  world  which  contains  in  itself  no 
abiding    reality.       Equally    unsatisfactory    is    the  rtalm  of 
transcendent  shadows  where  abstract  concepts  without  flesh 
and  blood  elude  the  grasp  of  the  seeker  after  truth.      The 
worlds  of  Being  and  of  Becoming  both  have  their  worth  and 
their  justification  but  neither  alone  can  be  said  to  have  true 
meaning  or  existence.      No  philosopher  has  recognized  more 
clearly  than  Schopenhauer  the  necessity  of  an  intimate  rela- 
tion between  these  two  worlds.     His  entire  system,  from  one 
point  of  view  at  least,    may  properly  be  considered  as    an 
explanation  of  the  physical  universe  through   superphysical 
concepts.     For    him    metaphysics   is  the   interpretation  of 
experience,  and  a  transcendental    hypothesis  is  valid  only  in 


mAmtifWe,'*  J8B>^- 


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so  far  as  it  is  adapted  to  phenomena.  He  has  styled  philoso 
phy  world  wisdom  whose  business  it  is  to  solve  the  riddle  of 
the  universe.  ''The  problem  of  meta})hysics,"  he  writes 
(11-201)  '^  "is  in  truth  not  the  observation  of  particular 
experiences,  but  the  proper  interpretation  of  the  totality  of 
experience.  Its  foundation  nnist,  therefore,  by  all  means 
be  of  an  empirical  nature, ' '  and  again,  metaphysics  ' '  never 
separates  itself  completely  from  experience,  but  is  simply 
the  explanation  and  exposition  of  the  same,  since  it  never 
speaks  of  the  thing-in-itself  otherwise  than  in  its  relation  to 
phenomena."    (11-208). 

Under  such  assumptions  no  metaphysical  system  can  lay 
claim  to  recognition  which  does  not  attempt,  at  least,  to  show 
its  connection  with  physics,  but  this  connection  Schopen- 
hauer, on  account  of  his  epistemological  presuppositions,  was 
perhaps,  of  all  metaphysical  in(iuirers,  least  able  to  establish. 
This  epistemology,  inherited  from  Kant,  is  in  certain 
important  respects  an  emendation  of  the  teachings  of  its 
author,  but  the  emendation,  especially  the  discarding  of  the 
distinction  between  the  understanding  and  the  reason  (the 
most  favorable  point  of  departure  for  a  metaphysics  on  the 
Kantian  basis),  can  hardly  be  said  to  have  been  suited  to  ai<l 
Schopenhauer  in  the  fornuilation  of  his  system.  Tlie  doc- 
trine of  the  complete  subjectivity  of  the  forms  of  space,  time 
and  causality,  together  with  the  categories  of  formal  lognc, 
precludes  the  hope  not  only  of  reaching  an  ultimate  reality, 
but  also  of  relating  such  to  experience  could  it  by  any  })os- 
sibility  be  discovered.  Kant  himself  was  in  the  main  am- 
sistent  in  the  carrying  oui  of  his  fundamental  princij^le.  In 
the  Prolegomena  he  raises  the  question  as  to  "  whether  such 


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9 


a  thing  as  metaphysics  be  even  possible  at  all  ''  and  his  con- 
clusion, though  not  so  formulated,  must  be  taken  in  the 
negative.  Kant  allows  metay)hysics  to  exist,  hvit  in  name 
only,  while  epistemology,  as  expounded  in  the  Criticnie  (tf 
Pure  Reason,  is  the  beirinnino^,  end  and  sole  content  of  tlie 
once  proud  science.  '' The  dogmatist,* '  says  Kant  i  preface 
to  the  iirst  edition  of  the  Critiijuei,  ''})r()mises  to  extend 
human  knowledge  beyond  the  limits  of  i)ossible  experience, 
while  I  hum])lv  confess  this  to  be  entirely  l>ev{md  my 
j)ower.  In  the  place  of  such  an  attempt  I  limit  myself  to 
the  examination  of  reason  and  its  ])ure  thought  solely."  To 
those, who  find  in  Kant's  aim  ^^of  al)oIishing  knowledge  to 
make  room  for  l)elief  '*  a  satisfactory  foundation  for  trans- 
cendental  knowledge,  the  following  passage  from  the  Criti(]ue 
of  I^u-e  Reason  is  noteworthy.  Here  he  asserts:  ''The 
conviction  (in  regard  to  the  existence  of  a  Godi  is  not  a 
logical  but  a  moral  certainty,  and  since  it  rests  on  subjective 
grounds  (of  the  moral  sentiment)  1  must  not  for  a  moment 
say  :  /t  As-  morally  certain  that  there  is  a  God,  etc.,  but  / 
((//f  morallv  certain,  etc.,  that  is,  the  belief  in  God  and 
in  another  world  is  so  interwoven  with  my  moral  sen- 
timent that  1  am  under  as  little  ap})rehension  of  losing 
the  former  as  of  having  the  latter  torn  from  me."-'' 
Such  belief  may  ])e  all  suHicient  from  a  i)rju:tical  stand})oint, 
but  it  can  hardly  be  called,  as  Caird-1-  would  maintain,  more 
than  knowledofe;  in  reality  it  is  soniethino'  far  less.  Further, 
whatever  sliixht  advantao^e  Schopenhauer  miiiiit  have  obtained 
from  the  practical  and  religious  side  of  the  Kantian  })hilos- 
o])hv,  he  himself  discards,  declarimr  the  second  edition  of  the 
Criticpie  a  ''bad  improvement  "  of  the  tir.^t.  in  which  Kant 


•  The  Roman  numerals  I  and  II  refer  to  the  first  and  second  volumes 
respectively  of  Schopenhauer's  "  Die  Welt  als  Wille  ujid  Vorstelluug," 
Brockh'aus  edition,  Leipzig,  1891. 


*  Vol.  II.,  p.  638;  Rrserikranz,  Leipzig;,  1838 

t  Edward  Caird,  '^The   Critical    Philosophy    of  Kaiit/'     New  York, 
1889. 


'^      / 


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through  the  weakness  of  old  age  withdrew  the  vigor  of  his 
attacks  upon  ''the  sacred  doctrines  of  dogmatic  philosophy. " 
Schopenhauer  in  accepting  Kant's  doctrine  and  in  insist- 
ing upon  its  most  literal  interpretation    failed,    a})parently, 
to  recognize  that  the  Critical  Philosophy  was  in  no  sense  a 
metaphysics,  and  when  held  strictly  to    its    presup})ositions 
mast  lead  to  the  overthrow  of  all  attempts  to  discover    an 
ultimate   reality.     The   doctrine   of    the  thing-in-itself,  the 
most  vulnerable  part  of  the  teaching  of  Kant,    is    misinter- 
preted by  Schopenhauer  into  a  positive  i)rinciple  and  made 
the  basis  of  an  attempt  to  reach  the    transcendent.       That 
such  an  attempt  v/as  essentially  self  contradictory  and  implic- 
itly contained  the  germs  of  its  own  destruction  was  disregarded, 
,  while  Schopenhauer,  reaching  the  thing-in-itself  by  a  method 
in  sharpest  contradiction   to   a  theory  of   knowledge   which 
declared    all    relation    between    phenomena    and    noumena 
impossible,  f-eeks  to  tit  out  this  absolute  (which,  however,    is 
never  really  the  thing-in-itself)  into  a  principle  for    the    ex- 
planation of  experience.     Yet  when  the  world  of  sense  and 
the  thing-in-itself  are  once  completely  sundered,    no    brid-j^e 
can  span  the  gulf  between  them.      Schopenhauer,    however, 
does  not  shrink  from  the  task.      Indeed,  why  should  he,   as 
for  him  paradoxes  are  evidences  of  profundity  and    contra- 
dictions  are   the   most  certain   of    truths  "i     But  it  is  to  be 
noted  that  as   long  as   Schopenhauer  holds   strictly   to   the 
Kantian    epistemology    his    success  is    never  real,  and  oiily 
temporarily  apparent.      The  thing-in-itself  either  remains  an 
empty  form,  or  becomes  a  tangible  thing  of  flesh  and  blood 
by   suffering  reduction  to   the  rank  of  simple  phenomena, 
while  it  bears  a  name  to  which  it  is  no  longer  entitled.    The 
/true  thing-in-itself,  as  far  as  it  is  reached  at  all  by  Schopen- 
\  hauer,  is  arrived  at  by  emi)loyingan  epistemological  ground- 


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11 


work  not  recognized  by  the  Critical  Philosophy.  What  this 
epistemology  is  will  later  appear,  but  for  the  present  atten- 
tion will  be  directed  to  Schopenhauer's  failure  to  pass  be- 
yond phenomena  according  to  his  own  doctrine  most  clearly 
expressed  in  his  doctor's  dissertation  ''On  the  Fourfold 
Root  of  the  Prmciple  of  Sufficient  Reason.'' 

2.  ]  This  dissertation,  though  the  earliest  of  Schopenhauer's 
works,  is  bv  no  means  his  least  able,  and  bv  far  the  most 
consistent.  Yet  even  here  mav  l^e  seen  the  necessarv  char- 
acter  of  the  contradictions  which  a})pear  in  his  su])se(iuent 
metaphysical  writings,  since  in  this  treatise  Schopenhauer 
deliberately  cuts  oft'  all  paths  which  might  lead  to  noumena 
by  limiting  all  relations  to  the  world  of  phenomena.  The 
four  possible  modes  of  relation  set  forth  are:  (1)  the  logi- 
cal; (2)  the  spacial  and  temporal;  (3)  the  causal:  (4)  the  tel- 
eological.  Yet,  as  has  l)een  previously  pointed  out,  Scho- 
penhauer's express  aim  is  to  explain  the  world  of  sense  in 
its  relation  to  the  thing-in-itself  and  not  to  discover  a  trans- 
cendent reality  which  has  no  connection  with  phenomena. 
Relations  must  be  assumed  and  it  therefore  becomes  nec- 
essarv to  examine  more  closely  these  four  forms  as  treated 
by  the  philosopher  in  order  to  discover  if  any  secret  door  re- 
main by  which  he  may  surreptitiously  pass  from  phenomena 
to  noumena.  The  iirst  two  modes  of  relation  are  clearly 
in  themselves  insufficient  for  Schopenhauer's  purpose.  The 
attempt  to  construct  a  universe  out  of  mere  logical  rela- 
tions finds  its  exemplication  and  inadequacy  in  the  Abso- 
lute Thought  of  the  Hegelian  school.  Materialism,  like- 
wise, fails  to  explain  reality  by  positing  atoms  which  have 
their  sole  bond  of  connection  in  space  and  time.  Indeed, 
such  a  method  of  building  up  a  world  is  definitely  repudi- 
ated by  Schopenhauer.      The  meagreness  of  these  concepts  in 


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themselves,  however,  does  not  exclude  the  i)ossibility  of 
their  obtaining  importance  in  connection  with  the  second 
two  modes  of  relation,  the  causal  and  the  teleological  which 
are  evidently  nuich  weightier. 

Upon  examination  the  causal   law  is   found  to  have  a  most 
intimate  connection    with    the  temporal  and  s{)acial  notions, 
so  intimate  in  fact  that  at  tirst    sii^ht   it  mav  seem  that  this 
law  can  have  no  real  njeaning  when  se[)arated  from  action  in 
space  and  occurrence  in  time.      A  closer  investigation  reveals 
the  fact  that  the  causal  notion  is  of  a    dual  nature  ;    a  fact 
which   if  not    cirefully  held  in  mind  may    lead  to  serious 
anomalies    and    contradictions.      These   dithculties  arise    in 
viewing    the    causal     law    purely    siih    specie    teinpnri^^    as 
expressed  in    the    fornuda  :     Every    change    has  its  cause. 
This  temporal  notion  of  causality  requires  that  between  every 
cause   and  its  effect  a  certain   interval   of  time   shall   have 
elapsed  ;    otherwise  we  have  an  eii'ect  contemporaneous  with 
the  cause  amino  chan^^e  has  resulted.      Yet  here  a  diflicultv 
for  thought  arises,  for  a   cause   which  is  separated  from  it> 
effect  for  the  smallest  conceivable  time   is  not  })roperly  tiie 
cause  of  the  given  effect.      If  between  the  cause  A   and  the 
effect  B  a  time  interval  exists,  reason  will  attempt  to  till  up 
the  gap,  as  for  example  .1,  a,   h,   B;  in   which   series  a  is 
the  eff'ect  of  A  and  the  cause  of  h,  which  in  turn  becomes 
the  cause  of   B.      But  again  the  same  difficulty  repeats  itself, 
for  between  each   member  of   the  time   series  in  the  second 
formula  a  certain  time  is  likewise  supposed  to  have  ela})sed. 
Other  members  must  be  introduced  and  the  process  nuist  be 
carried  on  ad  injinltny,.     Thus  reason    at  this  point  finds 
the  temporal  notion    of    rausality    inadequate.      I)e  riatura 
rat  Ion  !h    est    ren  sah  quadant    (eternUatiH    specie  percipere 
(Spinoza,  Ethics).      From  another  standpoint  the  causal  law 


s 


) 


\ 


$>  ^ 


h     , 


13 


presents  a  similar  difliculty.  A  as  the  cause  of  B,  contains 
in  itself  no  sufficient  ground  for  the  effect  which  proceeds 
from  it,  since  A  likewise  must  be  regarded  as  an  effect  of  a 
preceding  cause.  In  seeking  to  ffnd  a  cause  for  B  which  in 
itself  shall  not  ))e  contingent  (does  not  owe  its  existence  to  a 
|)receding  cause),  thought  fails  to  find  satisfaction,  being 
confronted  ])y  an  eternal  regress.  Again  reason  finds  itself 
in  a  helpless  tangle.  T)e  luiturd  cinm  raii-rui..'^.  c-i  rc>^  id  nec- 
essarais  et  non  id  c(>)ili ngtntes  corde)nplarl  (S\n\\o7.Q.^  Ethics.) 
Kant's  treatment  of  the  causal  law  both  in  the  Critique 
and  in  the  Prolegomena,  is  especially  pertinent  in  considera- 
tion of  this  latter  anomalv.  In  the  solution  of  the  third 
antinomv  two  notions  of  causality  are  presented,  one  of 
which  the  philosopher  terms  the  causality  of  nature,  the 
other  that  of  freedom.  The  causalitv  of  nature  is  limited  to 
phenomena  as  necessarilvoccurin^  in  time.  Of  the  causality 
of  freedom  Kant  says  (Prolegomena,  §  53):  ''If,  on  the 
other  hand,  freedom  be  the  characteristic  of  certain  causes 
of  phenomena,  it  must  as  regards  the  latter  as  events  ])e  a 
faculty  of  beginning  them  from  itself  [sponte)^  i.  e.  without 
the  causalitv  of  the  cause  itself  havinix  Ijegun,  and  hence 
another  f^round  would  be  necessarv  to  determine  the  begin- 
ning.  In  this  case,  however,  the  cause  as  to  its  causality, 
must  not  he  s\d)jected  to  time  deterinlnations  of  its  state,  that 
is,  it  must  not  be  phenomena,  but  must  l)e  regarded  as  a 
thin<r-in-itself  and  its  eff'ects  onlv  as  phenomena.''^-  Th-.s 
for  Kant  the  causalitv  of  nature  is  entirely  immanent.  Its 
application  is  to  the  phenomenal  world  with  its  spacial  and 
temporal  relativity,  where  it  finds  itself  operative  in  an  end- 
less circle  and  can  never  separate  itself  from  the  ceaseless 
flux  of  events.  The  cause  of  freedom,  on  the  other  hand, 
ambitiously  rising  above  the  world,  seeks  the  changeless  and 


*  Bax's  translation,  London,  1891. 


\ 


/ 


\ 


{ 


14 

timeless  existence  of  nounienal  reality.  It  is  to  be  observed 
that  many  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  the  causal  notion 
vanish  when  it  is  separated  into  natural  and  metaphysical 
causality.  Natural  causality  may  be  termed  occasional  cau- 
sality. It  does  not  contain  in  itself  the  causality  of  its 
cause  ;  hence  nowhere  in  the  phenomenal  series  can  the  mind 
find  this  element  which  belongs  to  metaphysical  causality 
alone.  Further,  it  is  to  be  seen  that  natural  causality  is 
totally  unable  to  annul  the  interval  between  itself  and  its 
effect.  In  metaphysical  causality  alone  can  the  effect  be  con- 
temporaneo'js  with  its  cause,  since  here  no  temporal  deter- 
minations exist.  Metaphysical  causality  must  be  considered 
as  the  basis  of  phenomena,  natuvd  naturan^^  npc^rov  uiv- 
ovv.  Natural  causality,  however,  is  simply  the  occasion 
for  the  individual  manifestations  of  metai)hysical  causality, 
naturanaturata,  vXtj.  It  is  this  material  mechanical  cau- 
sation which  the  empirical  sciences  recognize. 

A  careful  distinction  of  the  two  ideas  implicit  in  causality 
is  most  important  for  a  clear  understanding  of  the  system  of 
Schopenhauer,  not  only  as  considered  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  pure  causal  notion,  but  also  when  treated  in    connection 
with  the  teleological  notion  which  Schc^penhauer    sets    forth 
as  a  special  instance  of  the  causal  law.    The  teleological  rela 
tion    is   an    essential  modification    of   the   causal    idea,    in- 
asmuch as  the  end  of  an  action   exists  as  tue   cause  of  the 
events  which  precede  and  lead  up  to  it.   The  ordinary  causal 
formula  becomes  reversed,  the  series  c,   h,  a,  taking  place 
of  a,   b,   c,.     The  possibility  of  such  a  readjustment  of  the 
causal  series  is,  as  commonly  interpreted,  dependent  on  con- 
sciousness and  the  priority  of  e  to  a  and  />  demands  the  notion 
of  time.      Here  the  idea  of  the  end  arises  in  time  and  the 
entire  series  is  determined  by  the  relation  of  the  members  in 


) 


s 


(^ 


• 


J 


/ 


15 


time.  Such  a  teleology  involves  the  positing  of  a  material  in 
which  the  idea  finds  but  a  partial  realization  and  is  exemplifi- 
ed in  the  plan  of  the  builder  as  seen  in  the  product  of  his 
skill.  Against  this  conception  Kant's  polemic  is  directed  in 
his  discussion  of  the  physico -theological  proof  for  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  The  teleological  idea  when  freed  from  the 
l)onds  of  time  rises  to  the  dignity  of  a  metaphysical  cause 
and  becomes  of  a  different  character  than  the  temporal 
notion  of  causality.  Here  the  priority  of  the  end  is  not 
temporal  but  logical;  further  the  end  is  not  realized  in  a 
material  foreign  to  itself,  the  effect  appearing  with  its  cause. 
An  attempt  has  been  made  to  conceive  such  teleology  as 
independent  of  consciousness.  The  conception,  however,  if 
it  is  considered  objectively  demands  a  cause  working  along 
the  lines  of  thought.  Whether  this  is  possible  without 
thought  is  an  important  ([uestion,  but  cannot  materially 
change  the  notion  of  the  teleological  law  itself.  If  this 
teleological  cause  is  treated  purely  subjectively  it  becomes, 
as  with  Kant,  simply  a  heuristic  principle  for  the  interpreta- 
tion of  phenomena  and  its  application  to  a  world-ground  in 
itself  is  unjustifiable.  In  the  subsequent  discussion  it  will  be 
seen  what  an  important  })art  the  causal  law  plays  in  Schop- 
enhauer's attempts  to  connect  phenomena  and  noumena.  It 
will  then  be  shown  that  the  philosopher  avails  himself  of  the 
metaphysical  character  of  the  causal  notion,  though  never 
admittino:  its  existence.  The  teleoloofical  determination  of 
this  notion  will  likewise  be  found  to  have  a  most  intimate 
and  vital  connection  with  the  system  under  consideration, 
transforming  it  in  the  end  to  such  an  extent  that  the  original 
doctrine  is  to  a  great  measure  done  away  with.  Before, 
however,  tracing  the  various  steps  of  this  transition  and 
before  outlining  Schopenhauer's  procedure  in  his  attempt  to 


I 


f  I 


16 

construct  a  iiielupliysico  and  relate  it  to  the  world  of  ex- 
perience, it  will  be  advantageous  to  point  out  more  clearly 
the  general  point  of  view  from  which  the  system  as  a  whole 
proceeds. 

3.]    When  w^e  seek  to  discover  Schopenhauer's  teachings 
concerning  the  nature  of  the  two  worlds  of  phenomena  and 
y  \        nouraena  we  do  not  lind  his  statements  in  relation  to  them  at  all 
times  consistent  and  satisfactory.      As  has  been  said,  however, 
the  doctrine  set  forth  is  plainly  a  development  in  the  first 
instance  of  the  Kantian  philosophy  from   the  standpoint   of 
the    thing-in-itsrflf.      The    thing-in- itself,    as    with  Kant,   is 
removed  entirely  from  the  world  of  relation,  for  a  thing  in 
relation  can  no  longer  be  a  thing-in-itself.      Despite  this  the 
thing-in-itself  is  considered    by  Scho|)enhauer  in  accordance 
with  Kant  as  the  ground  of  phenomena;  but  from  this  point 
onward  Schopenhauer  advances  beyond  the  point  of  view^  of 
the  Critical  Philosophy,  and  seeks  to  give  a   positive  deter- 
mination to  this  transcendent  and  purely  limitative  concep- 
tion.     We  are  told  by  Schopenhauer   that  the  thing-in-itself 
is  the  hv  Hoi  nav^  the  one  and  the  all.      That  in  this  concep- 
tion there  is  not  added  an  imj)()rtant  or  productive  princij)Ie 
for  the  development  of  the  barren  ide.t  of  the  thing-in-itself, 
but  rather  another  purely  negative    motion,    Schopenhauer 
clearly  shows  in  his  statement  concerninir  the  nature  of  the 
unity  involved  in  the  idea.      '^  It  (the  will)  is  one,  vet  not  as 
an  object  is  one,  whose  unity  is  recognized  only  in  opposition 
to  a  possible  multiplicity,  nor  again  as  a  concept  is  one  which 
arises  only  by  abstraction  from  multiplicity;  but  it  is  one  as 
that    which    lies    beyond    time    and    space,  the  prlnclpunn 
individuation  Is  ^  that  is  the  possi})ility  of  multiplicity."     (I- 
134).      It  is  here  evident  that  Schopenhauer  reaches  the    ^'y 
Hal  nav    purely  as  the  opposing  pole  of   phenomena,  thus 


>      \( 


V 


' 


) 


( 


/ 


17 


remaining  in  the  fullest  accord  with  the  Critique  of  the  Pure 
Reason  by  holding  to  the  absolute  ideality  of  space  and  time 
together  with  the  pure  phenomenal  application  of  the  causal 
law.  The  fact  that  he  does  not  accept  the  remaining  Kantian 
Categories  of  the  understanding  as  constructive  principles, 
while  making  the  category  of  causality  a  function  of  simple 
intuition  is  an  interesting  detail  in  his  theory  of  knawledge, 
but  is  not  significant  in  considering  his  doctrine  as  to  the 
nature  of  phenomena. 

Schopenhauer's  doctrine  in  its  most  radical  form  may, 
perhaps,  be  considered  as  a  legitimate  development  of  the 
Kantian  epistemology,  but  is  certainly  not  in  accord  w  ith 
the  evident  meaning  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  Expressed 
in  a  word,  it  is  the  complete  relativity  of  all  things.  The 
world  is  relative  first  of  all  in  its  particular  determinations, 
l)ecause  each  individual  thing  exists  only  in  relation  to 
another  in  the  ceaseless  flow  of  time,  in  the  boundless 
extent  of  space  and  in  the  eternal  regression  of  the  causal 
nexus.  Nothing  is  permanent,  all  flows.  In  this  Heracli- 
tean  w^orld  of  kaleidoscopic  change  exist  only  forms  and 
shapes  which  know  no  abiding.  The  w^orld  which  we  appre- 
hend wdth  our  senses  ' '  is  purely  appearance  and  knowledge 
^f  7>r/(^>7'^  has  validity  simply  in  relation  to  this."  Further, 
the  world  considered  as  a  totality  is  as  relative  as  the  parts 
which  compose  it,  since  the  world  exists  for  us  an  object ; 
but  as  an  object  requires  a  subject  and  has  no  permanence  of 
its  own,  so  the  world  vanishes  when  the  subject  disappears, 
''The  entire  world  is  only  an  object  in  relation  to  a  subject, 
the  intuiting  of  intuitions,  in  a  word  idea.  All  which 
belongs,  or  even  can  belong,  to  the  w^orld  is  inevitably  con- 
ditioned in  this  determination  through  the  subject  and  is 
there   only   for  the  subject."        (1-4).     Berkeley  is  praised 


\ 


V 


\ 


/ 


c 


\ 


I  * 


18 

by  Schopenhauer  for  giving  a  definite  expression  to  the 
principle  which  finds  e.^-^e  alone  in  i^ercipi  and  allows  the 
world  to  exist  only  as  a  dream.  The  world  which  presents 
itself  to  our  senses  has  ''purely  a  seeming  existence."  It  is 
the  veil  of  Maja  and  something  so  completely  unreal  that  we 
can  deny  its  being  with  as  much  pro[)riety  as  we  can  affirm 
it.  So  the  external  world  becomes  reduced  to  a  mere  sub- 
jective feeling.  Yet  this  idealistic  position  allows  the  sul)- 
ject  to  remain  a  permanent  reality  amid  all  relativity,  but 
Schopenhauer  with  one  bold  sweep  removes  this  last  solid 
foothold.  He  cannot,  it  is  true,  refute  the  teaching  of  com- 
plete subjective  idealism,  though  he  pronounces  those  who 
seriously  maintain  it  fit  subjects  for  the  madhouse.  He 
places  subject  and  object  on  equal  terms,  yet  he  does  not 
permit  the  objt:ct  to  exist  by  raising  it  to  the  permanence  of 
the  subject  ;  he  takes  the  converse  method  and  gives  the 
subject  an  existence  no  more  real  than  that  of  the  object. 
The  subject,  we  are  told,  is  only  the  subject  of  knowledge, 
which  must  have  for  its  correlate  an  object.  Here  we  find 
ourselves  confronted  by  a  relativity  from  which  there  seems 
no  possibility  of  escape.  The  world  considered  as  a  sum  of 
particular  things  has  no  stability,  since  each  individual  is 
conditioned  throuo:h  another  :  neither  has  the  world  as  a 
totality  any  greater  permanency,  since  it  is  conditioned 
thi  ough  a  subject,  and  lastly,  this  subject  exists  not  in  itself 
but  only  in  relation  to  an  object. 

Schopenhauer  attempts  to  reinforce  this  theoretical  position 
by  an  argument  based  on  empirical  observation,  thus  falling 
into  the  most  gross  and  self-evident  of  contradictions.  ''The 
subjective  and  the  objective,"  writes  the  philosopher  (11-12), 
constitute  no  e^>7?^//M/?/7/r,  that  which  is  immediately  known 
is  limited  by  the  skin,  or  rather  by  the  external  end  of  the 


y 


\ 


\ 


19 

nerves  which  lead  out  from  the  cerebral  system.     Without 
lies  a  world  of    which  we  have   no  other  knowledge   than 
through  pictures  in  our    head."     Here  the  subjectivity  of 
the  impressions  of    sense  is   attempted  to  be    proved  by  a  - 
process  of  reasoning  based  on  the  physical  construction  of 
our  bodies,  but  unfortunately  for  Schopenhauer's  contention, 
our  bodies  (at  least  as  extended  in  space  and  active  in  time) 
are  impressions  from  the  idealist's  standpoint  as  purely  sul)- 
jective  as  the  forest,   the  field  or  the  sky.      It  is   evident 
that  such  an  argument  could    have    weight  only    when    we 
assume  that  we  possess  a  knowledge  of  the  construction  of 
our  bodies  not  derived  through  empirical  means.      Schopen- 
hauer has  credited  man  with  a  knowledge  of  certain  things 
belonging   to    the    external    world    (here  the  brain  and  the 
nerve  organs)  in  order  to  prove  that  the  external  world   is 
removed  entirely  from  our  knowledge.     In  fact,  he  does  not 
shrink  from  giving  definite  expression  to  this  most  palpable 
of  errors,  by  asserting  that  in  his  explanation  the  existence 
of  the  body  presupposed  the  world  as  idea  in  as  much  as 
the  body  exists  as  body,  or   real  object,  alone  in  the  world 
as  idea;  and  on  the  other  hand  the  idea  itself  presupposes 
the  body,   since  the  idea  arises  alone  through  the  function 
of  an  organ  of  the  same.     Thus  Schopenhauer,   following 
the  most""  radical    of   the  French    materialists,  reduces    the 
intellect   to  a    simple   function    of   the   brain,  while    at  the 
same  time  asserting  that  the  whole  world  hangs  on  a  single 
thread,    consciousness.      "  The  intellect,  as  of    a  secondary 
nature'  is  dependent  throughout  on   a  particular  organ,  the 
brain,  whose  function  it  is,  just  as  grasping  is  the  function 
of  the  hand,''      (11-278.)     Such  a  doctrine  can   hope  for  no 
rational  justification,  and  its  only  defence  is  to  be  found    in 
the  words  of  Tertullian;    "  Credihile  est  quia  hieptum  est, 


\ 


/ 


< 


I 


\  I 


i  i 


i 


!■      I 


20 


cerium  est  quia  impossiUe  est^  credo  quia  alsurdum.^''  At 
this  point  we  find  Schopenhauer's  theory  of  cognition  devel- 
oped to  its  most  absurd  consequences.  His  position  in 
reo-ard  to  the  nature  of  consciousness  leads  to  the  absolute 
relativity  of  the  world  from  the  empirical  side  as  does  his 
epistemology  from  the  theoretical  side. 

Under  such  conditions  it  is  easy  to  see  why  Schopenhauer 
at  the  outset  is  compelled  to  seek  his  only  reality  in  a  thing- 
in-itself,  which  when  closely  examined  is  nothing  more  or 
less  than  bare  Eliatic  Being,  whose  conception  is  condi- 
tioned on  the  abstraction  from  it  of  all  characteristics  of 
the  world  of  phenomena.  Yet  such  a  pure  essence  is  to- 
tally incapable  of  furnishing  a  ground  for  the  world.  A 
positive  quality  is  therefore  sought  from  which  the  world 
may  be  developed.  This  positive  quality  Schopenhauer 
finds  in  his  conception  of  the  will,  but  here  again  the  phil- 
osopher is  obliged  to  deny  to  it  all  phenomenal  qualities. 
This  will  lacks  at  the  outset  what  is  ordinarily  regarded 
as  the  sijie  qua  nm  of  its  existence,  i.  e.  self -conscious- 
ness. It  becomes  a  perfectly  blind  and  aimless  principle 
removed  from  all  change.  It  retains  the  name  of  will,  but 
the  substance  of  this  name  has  vanished.  Schopenhauer  by 
playing  fast  and  loose  with  this  conception  is  able  at  one 
time  to  make  the  will  assume  the  functions  of  the  thingr-in- 
itself,  at  another  time  to  give  it  all  the  definite  determina- 
tions of  its  phenomenal  manifestations.  In  other  words  the 
will  has  two  distinct  sides,  one  phenomenal  and  the  other 
noumenal,  so  that  by  the  double  use  of  language  Schopen- 
hauer is  able  to  present  a  plausible  argument  for  his  meta- 
physical theory.  The  phenomenal  world,  too,  is  made  to 
appear  in  a  dual  character.  Schopenhauer  interprets  his 
proposition:   ''The  world  is  my  idea  "  at  one  time  as  if   it 


21 


should  read,  The  world  is  my  idea,  and  nothing  more;  at 
another  time,  The  world  is  my  idea,  but  only  in  part. 
The  system  which  is  thus  constructed  has  at  the  best  an  in- 
secure foundation,  and  must  develop  w^ithin  itself  many 
contradictions,  until  it  at  length  breaks  out  into  open  contra- 
dictions with  its  epistemological  ground  work.  Finally  we 
find  a  return  to  the  Kantian  'standpoint,  and  in  his  ethical 
and  religious  philosophy,  Schopenhauer  once  more  exalts 
the  thing-in-itself  (no  longer  the  will)  to  a  point  beyond 
human  view  where  it  becomes  the  goal  of  religious  mysti- 
cism. 


y 


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22 


's  *■ 


I; 


i 
%  ■ 


CHAPTER  11. 

ATTEMPT  TO  JOIN  PHENOMENA    WITH  NOUMENA. 

j  f-y  CHOPENHAUER      compares     metaphysics     and 

4J  >w    physics   with   two   parties   of  miners    ^'who  far 
O   removed    from    each    other  tunnel  in  the  bosom 
of  the   earth   and   must   meet   if    they    work    properly/' 
This    simile    as   applied    to    Schopenhauer's    system    may 
be   taken   as  illustrative   of  the  mode  of  procedure    which 
it    exemplifies.     The   philosopher   seeks   to    unite  phenom- 
ena  and   noumena,  ^a)    by   iinding   in  the   world  traces  of 
the  thing-in-itself   and  (b)   by  introducing  into  the   thmg- 
in-itself  phenomenal  elements.   The  attempt  to  connect  nou- 
mena  with  phenomena  by  proceeding  from  the  latter    may 
be  set  forth  under  two  principal  points  of  view  as    illustra- 
ted, first  in  Schopenhauer's  epistemology,    and  secondly    in 
his  method  of  reaching  the  thing-in-itself  and  determining 
its  nature.     His  attempt    to  make  noumena  a  principle  for 
explaining  phenomena  divides  itself    into  four   main  topics 
according  to  his   various   ways  of  looking  at  the   thing-in- 
itself.     They  may  be  tabulated  as  follows: 
{a)     Theory  of  Parallelism;  the  philosophy  of  Spinoza: 
Q))     Theory  of  the  Empirical  and  Intelligible  Character;  the 

philosophy  of  Kant: 
(6^     Theory   of  the  Idea   and  its  copy;  the  philosoi)hy    of 

Plato: 
(d)     Theory  of  Immanence;  the  philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

Finally  Schopenhauer's  metaphysics  may  be  considered 
from  their  purely  negative  side  as  set  forth  in  his  ethical  and 
religious  teachings.  Here  we  find  ourselves  not  far  removed 
from  Fichte's  philosophy  and  Neo-Platonism. 


23 

Schopenhauer's  theory  of  cognition,  limiting  the  intellect, 
as  has  been  seen,  to  the  empirical  world  and  thought  through 
the  relativity  of   subject  and  object  and   through   the   four 
forms   of  the    Law    of  Reason    (^Satz  vom    Grunde)^  never 
reaches  beyond  the  circle   prescribed  by  itself  to  anything 
which  can  claim  an  independent  existence.    This  epistemology, 
instead  of  assuming  that  the  real  nature  of  an  object  becomes 
the  more  definite  the  more  it  relates  itself  to  the  subject  of 
knowledt>-e,  and  further  that   the  categories  of  intuition  and 
thourtht    brino-    to  lidit  the   true  essence  of  their  contents, 
maintains  with  strange  perversity  that  under  such  conditions 
the    obj'ct's    characteristics    arc  rendered  more    and    more 
uncertain.       In    fact  this  epistemology,   if  held  strictly    to 
account,  is  forced  to    admit  that  it  is  totally  unwarranted  in 
assuming    the  existence  of  anything    beyond    the    limits  of 
individual  consciousness.      Thus  knowledge,  which  Schopen- 
hauer defines  as    ''an    idea    resulting  from  a  physiological 
})rocess  in  the  brain  of  an  animal,"   is  no  longer  worthy  of 
its  name.      Kant  sought  to  save    his    olyject    from   absolute 
subiectivitv  }>v  recoonizin<T  in  it  an   clement  foreign   to  the 
pure  a  priori  categories  of  intuition  and  understanding,— a 
"  friven"  not  to  be  explained  ])y  thought;  a  something  which 
nuist  be  referred  tc  an  outer  cause,  i.  e.  the  thing-in-itself. 
Schopenhauer's  attack  on   Kant's  position   at  this  point  as 
inconsequential  is  doubtless  justifiable.      He  asserts  that  the 
thinor-in-itself  deo^enerates  under  Kant's  hands, to  an  object 
in  itself,  which  is  "an  imaginary  nothing  whose  assumption 
is    a    will-o'-the-wisp    in    philosophy."      "The    only    truly 
empirically   'given'   in  perception   is  the    entrance    of   the 
sensation  into  the  organs  of  sense:  the   presupposition   that 
this  must  have  a  cause  in  general  rests  on  a   law  having  its 
root  in  the  form  of  our  knowledge,    that  is,  in  the  functions 


/ 


/ 


!  t 


\ 


( 


1 


!    '  \ 


•       I 


24 

of  our  brain,  whose  origin  therefore  is  even  as  subjective  as 
the  impression  of  sense  itself,"  (IM3).  -  We  find  accord- 
ingly that  the  collective  elements  of  empirical  perception  lie 
in  ourselves  and  that  they  do  not  contain  that  which  might 
yield  a  sure  application  to  anything  totally  ditierent  from  us, 
a  thing-in-itself."-^  Hence  we  know  of  no  world  beyond 
that  of  our  sensations,  a  world  of  appearance  which  leads  us 
into  manifold  errors  and  is  the  source  of  all  (lelusion. 
The  intellect  ^^comprehends  simply  relations  of  things  and 
does  not  penetrate  into  their  inner  nature,  into  their  proper 
being.  It  is  accordingly  a  simple  surface  power,  attaches 
itself  to  the  outer  side  of  things,  and  grasps  simply  ispvchs 
transltivas,  not  the  true  being  of  the  same."     (11-325). 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Schopenhauer  does  not  long  hold 
to  this  extreme  position,  since  to  have  persisted  in  it  would 
have  necessitated  the  abandoning   of   all    metaphysical    in- 
quiry.     We  soon  find  him  assuming  the  same  standpoint  as 
that  which  called  forth  h  s  criticism  of  Kant  by    discarding 
his  lirst  thesis:     The  world  is  my  idea,   and   nothing    more; 
and  i^norinjj  his  chanore  of  view,  holding  to  his  second   in- 
terpretation  of  his  idealistic  proposition,  i.  e.  The  world    is 
my  idea,  but  only  in  part.     Here  Schopenhauer  like    Kant 
discovers  a  ''given"  in  our  knowledge,   a   lawless   element 
not  amenable  to  a  prior l  rules.      ' '  First  where  all  assertions 
a  priori  cease,  consequently  in  the  completely  empirical  part 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  body,  therefore  in  the  form,  quality 
and  definite  manner  of  working  of  the  same,  that  will  reveals 
itself  which  we  have  already  recognized  and  established  as 
the  being  of  the  thing-in-itself"   (11-348.)     Pure  mathemat- 
ics and  pure  natural  science  together  with  logic  are    consti- 
tuted entirely  out  of  the  a  priori  elements  of  our   knowl- 
edge and  contain  nothing  foreign  to  these  forms.      ''These 

•Satz  vom  zureich.     Gunde,  §  21,  p.  82,  Brockhaus  edition. 


c 


«*  « 


\     I 


\ 


f 


1         » 


25 

sciences  show  us  nothing  more   than    simple    relations,    the 
connections  of  one  idea  with   another,   form  without   con- 
tent.     All  content    which   they    obtain,  every    phenomenon 
which  fills  these  forms,  possesses  soinetliing  no  longer  com- 
pletely hnowaUe  according  to  its  entire  being,  no  longer   to 
be  explained  completely  through  something   else,    therefore 
something  without  ground  on  account  of  which    knowledge 
loses  directly  in  evidence  and  forfeits  an  adequate    penetra- 
tion.    This  element  which  does  not  permit  of  foundation  is, 
however,  indeed  the  thing-in-itself,  is  that   which    is    essen- 
tially not  idea  nor  object  of  knowledge,    but   first    becomes 
known  by  entering  into  this  form  "  (1-144.)     Here  is  clearly 
presented  and  described  that  which   Kant   sets  forth  as  the 
irreducible  surd  in  knowledge.      It  is  nonsense  to    say    that 
the  mind  does  not  know  this  element,  since   to   know  of  its 
existence  is  to  know  it,  not  completely  and  adequately,   per- 
haps, yet  in  a  degree   sufficient  to   allow  a  departure  from 
the  world  of  phenomena  to  that  of  noumena. 

By  what  means  does  Schopenhauer  accomplish  this  trans- 
ition ?  Kant  is  condemned  for  employing  the  causal  law, 
but  his  critic's  procedure  is  identical  with  that  of  Kant,  as  a 
closer  investigation  into  the  nature  of  that  which  Schoi^en- 
hauer  regards  as  the  "given"  in  cognition  will  show. 
This  "given"  appears  perhaps  most  clearly  in  the 
treatment  of  the  great  elemental  powers  of  nature  {Natur- 
krafte.)  These  Naturhrafte  determine  the  definite  man- 
ner in  which  objects  act,  they  are  "the  quality,  the 
character  of  every  phenomenon,  the  ungrounded,  that 
which  does  not  depend  on  the  form  of  the  phenomenon, 
the  Law  of  Reason.  They  are  that  to  which  the  form  in 
itself  is  foreign;  they  arc  that  which,  however,  enters  into 
this   form  according   to   whose   law   alone  they  make  their 


y 


\ 


\ 


( 


:  I 


r    I 


i    - 


I     i 


i 


i 


!ti 


24 

of  our  brain,  whose  origin  therefore  is  even  as  subjective  as 
the  impression  of  sense  itself,"  (IM3).  -  We  tind  accord- 
ingly that  the  collective  elements  of  empirical  perception  he 
in  ourselves  and  that  they  do  not  contain  that  which  might 
yield  a  sure  application  to  anything  totally  ditierent  from  us, 
a  thing-initself."'^  Hence  we  know  of  no  world  beyond 
that  of'our  sensations,  a  world  of  appearance  which  leads  us 
into  manifold  errors  and  is  the  source  of  all  delusion. 
The  intellect  ''  comprehends  simply  relations  of  things  and 
does  not  penetrate  into  their  inner  nature,  into  their  proper 
being.  It  is  accordingly  a  simple  surface  power,  attaches 
itself  to  the  outer  side  of  things,  and  grasps  simply  i^pvcles 
transitivas,  not  the  true  being  of  the  same."      (11-325). 

It  is  not  surprising  that  Schopenhauer  does  not  long  hold 
to  this  extreme  position,  since  to  have  persisted  in  it  would 
have  necessitated  the  abandoning   of   all    metaphysical    in- 
quiry.    We  soon  find  him  assuming  the  same  standpoint  as 
that  which  called  forth  h  s  criticism  of  Kant  by    discarding 
his  first  thesis:     The  world  is  my  idea,   and    nothing   more; 
and  ignoring  his  change  of  view,  holding  to  his  second    in- 
terpretation of  his  idealistic  proposition,  i.  e.  The  world    is 
my  idea,  but  only  in  part.     Here  Schopenhauer  like    Kant 
discovers  a  ''given"  in  our  knowledge,   a   lawless   element 
not  amenable  to  a  priori  rules.      ' '  First  where  all  assertions 
a  priori  cease,  consequently  in  the  completely  empirical  part 
of  our  knowledge  of  the  body,  therefore  in  the  form,  quality 
and  definite  manner  of  working  of  the  same,  that  will  reveals 
itself  which  we  have  already  recognized  and  established  as 
the  being  of  the  thing-in-itself"   (11-348.)     Pure  mathemat- 
ics and  pure  natural  science  together  with  logic  are    consti- 
tuted entirely  out  of  the  a  priori  elements  of  our  knowl- 
edge and  contain  nothing  foreign  to  these  forms.      ''These 

♦Satz  vom  zureich.     Gunde,  §  21,  p.  82,  Brockhaus  edition. 


C 


V  • 


i. 


\     i 


\ 


t 


•%  V 


25 

sciences  show  us  nothing  more  than  simple  relations,  the 
connections  of  one  idea  with  another,  form  without  con- 
tent. All  content  which  they  obtain,  every  phenomenon 
which  fills  these  forms,  possesses  sovietking  no  longer  cam- 
jyletely  ImowaUe  according  to  its  entire  being,  no  longer  to 
be  explained  completely  through  something  else,  therefore 
something  without  ground  on  account  of  which  knowledge 
loses  directly  in  evidence  and  forfeits  an  adequate  penetra- 
tion. This  element  which  does  not  permit  of  foundation  is, 
however,  indeed  the  thing-in-itself,  is  that  which  is  essen- 
tially not  idea  nor  object  of  knowledge,  but  first  becomes 
known  by  entering  into  this  form  "  (1-144.)  Here  is  clearly 
presented  and  described  that  which  Kant  sets  forth  as  the 
irreducible  surd  in  knowledge.  It  is  nonsense  to  say  that 
the  mind  does  not  know  this  element,  since  to  know  of  its 
existence  is  to  know  it,  not  completely  and  adequately,  per- 
haps, yet  in  a  degree  suflacient  to  allow  a  departure  from 
the  world  of  phenomena  to  that  of  noumena. 

By  what  means  does  Schopenhauer  accomplish  this  trans- 
ition ?  Kant  is  condemned  for  employing  the  causal  law, 
but  his  critic's  procedure  is  identical  with  that  of  Kant,  as  a 
closer  investigation  into  the  nature  of  that  which  Schopen- 
hauer regards  as  the  "given"  in  cognition  will  show. 
This  "given"  appears  perhaps  most  clearly  in  the 
treatment  of  the  great  elemental  powers  of  nature  {Natur- 
krafte,)  These  Naturkrafte  determine  the  definite  man- 
ner in  which  objects  act,  they  are  "the  quality,  the 
character  of  every  phenomenon,  the  ungrounded,  that 
which  does  not  depend  on  the  form  of  the  phenomenon, 
the  Law  of  Reason.  They  are  that  to  which  the  form  in 
itself  is  foreign;  they  arc  that  which,  however,  enters  into 
this    form  according   to    whose    law    alone  they  make  their 


/ 


) 


i 


26 

appearance;  which   law,    however,  determines   the  appear- 
ance    alone,     not    that     which     appears,     only    the    how, 
not   the    what   of    the    phenomenon,    only    the    form,    not 
the   content."     (1-145.)       ''That     which     indeed     always 
lends    to    a    cause,    though    it   may    appear    innumerable 
times,  its  ability  to  work  is  a  power  of  nature,   is    as    such 
groundless,  that  is,  lies  completely  outside  of  the    chain    of 
caut^ation  and  in  general  of  the  i)rovince  of  the  Law  of  Rea- 
son and  is  philosophically  recognized  as  the    immediate   ob- 
jectivity of  the  will,  which  is  the  kernel  {(ui-sich)  of  nature 
in    its  entirety"   (1-155.)     The  forces    of   nature    are     the 
dynamic    element    in    the    universe,  that  which    acts  in    it- 
self and  exists    independent  of  space  and  time  and   the  eter- 
nal succession  of  phenomena.      What    Scho[)cnhauer    really 
describes  here  is  not  far  to  seek.      It   is  the    causal    law    in 
its  non-temporal  character  ;  that  which  Kant  calls  the  cause 
of  freedom,  and  that  which  the   mind    intuitively    seeks    in 
order  to  escape  from  the  relativity  of  the  world    of    sense. 
It  was  this  notion  of  causality  w^hich  enabled  Kant    to    con- 
clude from  his  "  given  "  to  a  something  lying   beyond,   and 
it  is  this  very  same  notion  that    Schopenhauer    instinctively 
employs  though  he  refuses  to  allow  to  it  the  name  of  caus- 
ality.    He  was  enabled  to  do  this  by  interpreting  the    caus- 
al law  as  applying  alone  to   phenomenal    succession.       The 
causal  law,  we  are  told,   is   expressed    as    follows:    "  Every 
chansre  has  its  cause  in  another  which  immediatelv  precedes 
it.     If  something  hai)})ens     ''^     '••      "      ^'     '"      it  is  necessary 
that  something  else  unmediately  preceding  should  have  un- 
dergone a  change;  before  this  again  something  else,  and    so 
on  into  infinity;  for  a  first  cause  is  as  impossible  to  think  as 
a  beiTinnino:  to  time  or  a  limit  to  space"  (11-4:9.)      "Every 
change  in  the  material  world  can  take  place  only  in    so    far 


1 


f 


27 

as  another  immediately  precedes  it;  this  is  the  true  and  com- 
plete content  of  the  causal  law"  (11-46.)     Further,   Scho- 
penhauer maintains  that  the  meaning  of   the  causal    law    is 
limited  to  occasional  causation  and   does   not   recognize    as 
causality  that  element  which  lends  to  the  cause  its  causality. 
''Every    natural    cause     is    only    occasional    cause,    offers 
only     the    occasion,    the  opportunity    for   the   appearance 
of  the    one    and    individual    will."     (1-164.)      The  nature 
of    the   causal   notion   as   interpreted  by  Schopenhauer   is 
further     illustrated     by      his    treatment     of     the     concep- 
tion of  matter,  a  second  element  which  is  descriljed    as    ex- 
istino-  free  from  the  endless  succession  of  phenomena.      The 
essence  of  matter  is  expressed  in  the  causal  idea.     We    are 
told  that  it  is  the  causal  law  thought  in  general;  or  in  other 
words  that  it  is    the    vehicle    for    the    manifestation    of  the 
thing-in-itself.     It  may  further  be  descri])ed  as   the   condi- 
tion or  occasion  by  means   of  which   the   noumenal    world 
finds  expression  in  the  world  of  sense.     Matter   itself   can- 
not have  a  cause,  since  it  must  be  considered  as  the  a])strac- 
tion  of  the  causal  law.      "Matter  is  simply  a})ility  to    work 
in  general,  pure  working  as  such,    causality   itself   thought 
objectively"*     This  identification  of  the    causal    la^v    with 
matter  is    clearly  but    another    way    of    stating    Schopen- 
hauer's  previous   doctrine,    i.    e.    causality  is  simple  occa- 
sionalism.    Thus  we  find  in  Schopenhauer's  world  a  certain, 
perhaps  unavoidable,  dualism.     On  the  one  side  is  metaphy- 
sical causation,  on  the  other    the    cause    of  nature;  on    the 
one  side  pure  creative  energy,  on  the   other   the   matter    in 
which  it  imperfectly  realizes  itself.     These  two  notions   ap- 
pear from  time  to  time  in  Schopenhauer's  metaphysics,   but 
here  it  is  necessary  to  observe  only  that  the    former    notion 
is  as  essential  to  his  epistemology  as  the    latter,    though    as 
•  Satz  vom  zureich.     Grunde,  p.  82,  Brockhaus  edition. 


\ 


i 


28 

has  been  pointed  out  the  philosopher  does  not  openly  recog 

nize  the  fact. 

5.]  The  transcendental  employment  of  the  causal  law,  dis- 
tinctly apparent  even  in  the  epistemological  groundwork  of 
Schopenhauer- s  system,  shows  itself  yet  more  definitely  when 
his  method  of  reaching  and  determining  the  nature  of  the 
thing-in-itself  is  studied.  In  discussing  the  relativity  of  the 
phenomenal  world,  its  illusion  and  instability,  Schopenhauer 
promises  to  provide  a  more  secure  position  whence  the 
observer  can  look  upon  the  flux  of  events  and  yet  not  be 
caught  in  their  current.  This  elevation  above  the  world  of 
sense  cannot  be  reached,  we  are  informed,  by  any  process  of 
reasoning.  We  are  socking  for  ultimate  reality  and  here 
logic  is  of  no  avail.  ^'  Every  truth  is  the  relation  of  a  judg- 
ment to  something  outside  itself  and  an  inner  truth  is  a  con- 
tradiction "*  The  cognition  of  the  ultimate  must  be  a  direct 
and  immediate  intuition,  not  a  truth  in  the  ordinarily 
accepted  sense  of  the  term,  but  something  rising  higher 
than  the  relativity  on  which  such  truth  is  conditioned, — 
this  is  the  doctrine  of  Schopenhauer.  Where  then 
is  to  be  found  this  intuition  of  the  essence  of  the 
world  ?  The  answer  is,  in  self-consciousness,  the  only 
immediately  given.  At  this  point  is  to  be  noticed 
a  direct  break  with  the  Kantian  theory  of  cognition 
as  set  forth  in  the  Critical  Philosophy,  though  it  approxi- 
mates to  the  theory  expounded  in  Inaugural  Dissertation  of 
1770.  In  treating  of  the  source  of  Metaphysics  (Prolego- 
mena, §1).  Kant  writes,  * 'Neither  external  experience,  the 
source  of  physical  science  proper,  nor  internal  experience, 
the  groundwork  of  empirical  psychology  will  suffice  for  its 
foundation."  Again  he  says  :  ''lam  just  as  conscious  of 
the  reality  of  bodies  as  external  phenomena  in  space,  as  1  am 

♦  Satz  vom  zureich.  Grunde,  §  30,  p    107,  Brockliaus  edition. 


^ 


y; 


/ 


f 


29 

of  the  existence  of  my  soul  in  time  by  means  of  the  internal 
experience,  which  I  also  cognize  only  through  phenomena, 
as  an  object  of  the  internal  sense  (that  is,  as)  constituting  an 
internal  condition  of  which  the  essence  in  itself,  lying  at  the 
foundation  of  these  phenomena  is  unknown  to  me."  (Prol. 
§4:9.)*  This,  indeed,  was  the  only  consistent  position  that 
Kant  could  have  maintained,  since  all  our  internal  states  are 
conditioned  through  their  succession  in  time,  and  hence 
must  be  purely  phenomenal.  Schopenhauer  likewise  recog- 
nizes this  temporal  element  in  our  internal  consciousness, 
and  hence  the  thing-in-itself  (the  will)  appears  not  as  the 
unitary  one,  but  as  a  multiplicity.  "  I  know  my  will,"  he 
says  (I.  121),  "not  in  its  totality,  not  as  a  unit,  not  com- 
pletely according  to  its  being,  but  I  know  it  alone  in  its 
particular  acts,  therefore  in  time,  which  is  the  form  of  the 
phenomena  of  my  body,  as  of  every  object  :  therefore  tlic 
body  is  the  condition  of  the  knowledge  of  my  will."  Scho- 
penhauer, then,  clearly  admits  that  he  does  not  know  the 
thing-in-itself  directly,  but  only  its  phenomena,  but  he  hopes 
at  least  to  escape  in  part  from  the  world  as  idea  by  declar- 
ing that  we  have  a  more  immediate  knowledge  of  the  essence 
of  our  own  being  than  we  have  of  that  of  the  external  world. 
This  statement  can  mean  only  that  we  have  a  practical  knowl- 
edge of  our  own  existence,  a  knowledge  which  we  can  never 
doubt.  We  can  never  mistake  the  phenomena  of  the  inner 
sense  for  a  pure  dream,  or  conceive  ourselves  as  ultimately 
unreal.  Considered  from  this  standpoint  Schopenhauer's 
view  must  be  pronounced  correct.  Metaphysics,  however, 
aims  to  find  out  the  meaning  behind  phenomena  and  unless 
there  is  a  special  faculty  in  man  for  the  cognition  of  nou- 
mena,  can  arrive  at  its  ultimate  only  by  reasoning  from 
phenomena  as  effect.     Schopenhauer  urges  that  because   the 

*  Bax's  translation. 


/ 


i 


30 

internal  sense  is  not  subjected  to  all  the  a  priori  determina- 
tions of  the   external   world,    that   it  must   be   nearer   the 
thing-in-itself ;  yet  we  find  him  admitting  that  it  never    ap- 
pears free  from  time.     This  admission    becomes   most   sig- 
nificant when  we  inquire  more  closely  into  this  position  and 
discover  that  the  real  cause  of  the  delusion  of  the  world,  the 
veil  of  Maja,  is  this  very  category  of  time.      "Ihe  8u})strat 
or  filling,  TtXi'fpoD^cx,  or  the  matter  of  the  present,  is  through- 
out all  time  one  and  the  same.     The  impossibility  of  recog- 
nizing this    identity   is   indeed   time,   a  form  and  limit  of 
our  intellect.''   (11-5-1:9.)     The  deceptive  nature  of  time    is 
most  strongly  emphasized  in    Schopenhauer's    treatment    of 
history.      History  is  no  science,  since  it  limits  itself    to   the 
recounting  of  events.      It  has  to  do  only    with    the    transit- 
ory, with  that  which  now  is  and  then  passes  away.     ^' What 
history  narrates  is  in  fact  only  the    long,    heavy,    disturbed 
dream  of  humanity.''  (11-505)  When,  then,  we  are  informed 
that  the  will  as  thingr-in-itself  is  a  timeless  unit,  this  fact    is 
certainly  not  revealed  by  the  internal  sense  whose  most    ev- 
ident characteristic  is  succession  in  time. 

What,  then,  is  for  Schopenhauer  the  nature  of  the 
intuition  of  the  so-called  thing-in-itself.  He  tells  us  that 
everyoae  knows  immodiately  in  concreto  that  the  ))eing  in 
itself  of  his  own  phenomenal  life  is  his  will  "which  con- 
stitutes the  most  immediate  element  of  his  consciousness.  As 
such,  however,  it  has  not  completely  passed  into  the  form  of 
idea  in  which  object  and  subject  stand  over  against  one 
another,  but  it  makes  itself  known  in  an  immediate  manner, 
in  which  subject  and  object  are  not  with  complete  clearness 
differentiated."  (1-130).  When  we  consider  what  this  inner 
state  is  which  has  not  become  an  object  for  thought  we  find 
that  Schopenhauer  is  not  here  describing  some  mysterious 


\ 


\ 


I 


- 31 

revelation  from  another  world  That  internal  state  in  which 
the  will  is  revealed  as  the  kernel  of  personality  is  nothing 
more  or  less  than  what  is  psychologically  known  as  feeling 
(Gefil/d)^-.  In  the  first  book  of  the  World  as  Will  and 
Idea  (page  320)  Schopenhauer  says,  "Philosophy  can  never 
do  anything  more  than  explain  and  make  clear  what  is  given, 
l)ring  to  distinct,  abstract  knowledge  the  being  of  the  v/orld, 
which  i7i  concreto,  that  is  as  feel  in  ij,  expresses  itself  clearly 
to  everyone.'"'  In  placing  the  inmost  essence  of  the  person- 
ality in  feeling  Schopenhauer  nuist  be  credited  with  having 
given  expression  to  a  Aveiglity  psychological  truth,  •!•  but  to 
have  raised  such  an  empirical  fact  to  the  rank  of  the  thing- 
in-itself  is  a  fallacy  too  evident  to  need  criticism.  Schopen- 
hauer here  finds  himself  placed  on  the  horns  of  a  dilemma. 
Either  the  l)eing  of  the  world  becomes  reduced  to  feeling, 
or  rather  wdll  (a  term  which  for  the  philosopher  takes  into 
account  feeling  in  its  ordinary  sense),  and  is  therefore  of  a 
phenomenal  nature;  or  the  thing-in-itself  is  not  directly  and 


♦  This  term  may  be  taken  to  signify  for  Schopenhauer  an  inner  state 
which  includes  both  feeling  (simplyj  and  will. 

t  Interesting  in  this  connection  are  the  words  of  Lotze  (Mikrokos- 
nius,  Erster  Band,    Zweite  Auflage,  Seite  281.) 

*'Der  getretene  Wurm,  der  sich  im  Schmerze  kriimmt,  unterscheid- 
et  sein  eigenes  Leiden  gewiss  von  der  iibrigen  Welt,  obgleich  er  weder 
sein  Ich  noch  die  Natur  der  Aussenwelt  begreifen  mag.  Aber  die 
vollendete  Intelligenz  eines  Engels,  fehlte  ihr  jenes  Gefiihl,  wiirde 
wohl  scharfe  Anschauungen  des  verborgensten  Wesens  der  Seele  und 
der  Dinge  entwickeln  und  in  lichter  klarheit  die  Erscheinuug  ihrcr 
eigenen  inneren  Selbstspiegelung  beobachten,  aber  sie  wiirde  nie 
erfahren,  warum  sie  auf  ihren  Unterschied  von  der  iibrigen  Weltjemals 
einen  grosseren  Werth  leglen  sollte,  als  auf  die  zahlreichen  Verschied- 
enheiten  der  Dinge  iiberhaupt  die  sich  ihrer  Erkeuntnitss  ebenso 
darbeiten." 


<    A    i 


1 


II  I. 


32 

immediately  given  in  feeling  and  must  l)e  reached  through  a 
process  of  mediation.  Both  of  these  alternatives  are  made 
use  of.  Schopenhauer  admits  his  failure  to  reach  the  thing- 
in-itself  as  follows:  ''  Indeed,  we  have  never  maintained  an 
absolute  and  creative  knowledge  of  the  thing-in-itself,  but 
on  the  other  hand  have  recognized  very  well  that  it  is  im- 
possible to  know  anything  as  it  is  absolutely  and  for  itself. 
For  as  soon  as  I  know  I  have  an  idea;  this,  however,  cannot 
be  identical  with  the  known  because  it  is  my  idea.  ^"  '^  *  ^ 
■^  *  Therefore,  strictly  speaking  we  never  know  our  will 
other  than  as  phenomena, ' '  (II  566. )  Again :  ' '  A  knowledge 
of  things-in  themselves  in  the  strictest  sense  of  the  word 
would  accordingly  be  im];)ossil)le,  because  the  point  at  which 
the  being-in-itself  of  the  thing  commences,  knowledge 
ceases,"  (11-311.)  This  limiting  of  knowledge  to  phenom- 
ena, though  directly  in  accord  with  Kant's  teaching,  can- 
not of  course  be  Schopenhauer's  permanent  position,  if  he 
would  persist  in  his  attempt  to  explain  the  world  from  a 
transcendent  point  of  view.  In  so  far  as  phenomena  are  to 
be  given  a  permanent  ])asis  the  t)hilosopher  must  pass  beyond 
the  realm  of  sense;  but  how  is  this  transition  to  be  made, 
how  is  the  noumenal  world  to  be  reached  I  Evidentlv  the 
path  is  one  of  mediation,  that  is,  one  of  relation,  and  of  the  cat- 
egories of  relation  recognized  by  Schopenhauer  ])ut  one  can 
serve  the  purpose.  Logical  relations  are  too  intimately  con- 
nected with  the  philosophy  of  the  "charlatan''  Hegel  to  be 
even  spoken  of  without  anger  ;  space  and  time,  the j>ri7U'fj)iuni 
individuation  is  J  are  the  source  of  delusion  and  error;  it 
remains  for  causality  to  reach  the  unconditioned  from  the  con- 
ditioned.  It  is  evident  that  Schopenhauer  finds  the  starting 
point  for  his  theory  of  the  will  in  a  psychological  fact,  and  it  is 
equally  apparent  that  he  attempts  to  find  an  adequate  cause 


f 


/ 


33 

to  explain  the  phenomena  included  under  this  fact.  His  con- 
clusion is,  that  the  will  as  thing-in-itself  is  the  author  of  the 
individual,  phenomenal  wills.  We  are  told  that  the  ])ody  is 
the  irorl^  of  the  will,  that  in  the  will  alone  lies  the  eternol 
pou^pr  which  gives  rise  to  individual  forms.  The  will  is 
the  most  real  of  all  things,  but  '-that  which  docs  not  ad 
is  likewise  nothing  ' '  (11-3^2. )  But  the  concepts  of  ^rorl^i?^(7, 
of  jHNrrr,  of  action  are  the  very  essence  of  the  causal  idca."^' 
Schopenhauer's  procedure  in  atte!iii)ting  to  estal)lish  the  con- 
tention that  the  will  is  the  l)asis  of  the  |)henomcna  of  nature 
as  well  as  of  those  of  the  individual  Ego  shows  beyond  a  doubt 
that  he  conceived  a  causal  relation  to  exist  between  pheno- 
mena and  the  thing-in-itself.  He  saysJI-SOl^):  -  Along  the 
subjective  road  the  inner  nature  is  at  every  moment  acces- 
sible to  us:  there  we  find  it  immediately  as  the  will  in  our- 
selves, and  we  must  ihvough  the  jrri7ieij)Ie  of  analog!/  to  om' 
own  ])eing  be  able  to  solve  the  riddle  of  the  being  of  others." 
In  other  words,  Schopenhauer  finds  a  similarity  existing 
between  oiu-  bodies  and  oV)jects  in  the  external  world,  tliere- 
forc  he  concludes  that  the  crfNsc  which  produced  one  must  l)e 
the  same  as,  or  similar  to  that  whicli  produced  the  other. 
Thus  the  thing-in-itself  in  Nature  is  reached  l)y  an  undis- 
irnised  use  of  the  causal  law,  for  the  entire  validity  of  the 
nr-ument  from  analogy  rests  on  the  assumption  that  like 
causes  produce  like  effects,  t 


*  cf.  Sigwart's  Logic,   Band  II,  2  Auflage,  §  73. 

t  The  following  use  of  tliis  argument  to  establish  a  common  cause 
for  all  phenomena  in  the  external  world  is  noteworthy: 

"^ehe  ich  nun  auf  diese  Weise  Eines  sich  meinem  Bhcke  entziehen, 
ohne  dass  ich  je  erfahre  wohin  es  gehe  ;  und  ein  Anderes  hcrvortreten 
ohnedass  ich  je  erfahre,  woher  es  komme  ;  haben  dazu  noch  Beu.e 
dieselbeGestalt,  dasselbe  Wesen,  den  selben  Charakter,  nur  allem 


i 


<f 


/ 


^ 


r 


34 


nicht  die  selbe  Materie,  welche  jedoch  sic  audi  walirciid  ihres  Dascins 
fortwahrend  abwerfen  und  erneuern  ; — so  liegt  docli  wahrlicli  die 
Annahnie,  dass  Das,  was  verschwindet,  und  Das,  was  an  seine  Stelle 
tritt,  Eines  und  dasselbe  Wesen  sei."    (II-544.) 


> 


/ 


6 


I 


36 


CHAPTER  111. 

ATTEMPT  TO  JOIN  NOUMENA  WITH  THENX^MENA. 

T  is  now  evident  tiiat  Schopenliaiier  in  his  atteni})!  to 
estal)lish  a  connection  between  the  world  and  the  thina- 
in-itself,  in  so  far  as  he  sets  out  from  the  former,  is  suc- 
cessful only  through  employing  the  causal  law  as  the  1)ond  of 
this  connection;  for,  as  has  been  seen,  his  epistemology  hid- 
denly  recocrnizes  the  validity  of  this  law  in  its  transcendental 
ap})lication,  while  his  method  of  reaching  the  will  is  confront- 
ed with  the  necessity  of  employing  it.  The  question  now 
arises,  Can  the  philosopher  succeed  better  in  connecting 
phenomena  with  noumena,  proceeding  from  the  latter  ?  Can 
there  be  introduced  into  the  idea  of  the  thing-in -itself  any 
positive  (quality  by  which  it  will  be  possil)le  to  pass  from 
the  Avorld  of  Beinof  to  that  of  Becomini]^  in  any  other  man- 
ner  than  by  the  establishing  of  a  causal  connection  l^etween 
the  individual  thing  and  its  innermost  essence  ?  The  con- 
sideration of  the  problem  from  this  point  of  view,  as  has 
already  been  said,  involves  a  comparison  of  Schopenhauer's 
doctrine  with  the  systems  of  Spinoza,  Kant,  Plato  and  Aris- 
totle. 

' '  Betw^een  the  act  of  the  will  and  the  action  of  the  body 
there  is  absolutely  no  causal  connection,"  writes  Schopen- 
hauer,* 'i  but  both  are  immediately  one  and  the  same  per- 
ceived in  a  double  manner,  once  in  self  consciousness,  or 
the  inoer  sense,  as  an  act  of  the  will,  and  at  the  same  time 
in  the  outer,  spacial  phenomena  of  the  brain  as  an  act  of  the 
body."  Ao-ain  :  "  In  reflection  alone  is  wall  and  act  dif- 
ferent,  in  reality  they  are  one.      Each  true,   genuine,  imme- 

*     Satz  vorn  zureich.      Grunde,  §  21,  p.  79.     Brockhau's  edition. 


V 


/ 


diate  act  of  tho  will  is  directly  and  inime  liately  also  a    visi- 
ble act  of  the  body,  and  corresponding  to  this  on  the  otlier  side 
every  affection  of  the  body  is  also  at    once    and  iuiincdiatoly 
an  affection  of    the  wiir^  (1-120.)     The   doctrine  expressed 
here  is  that  of  an  exact  parallelism   between    the    inner    and 
the  outer  series  of  phenomena.     The  entire  body    presents 
in    its  particular   changes  the  outer  side  of   an  inner  nature 
corresponding    exactly    to    it.      Yet  again,    -  as  the    human 
body  in  general  corresponds  to  the  liumjui   will    in  general, 
so  the  individual  bodily  structure,  which   consecinently  com- 
pletely and  in  all  parts  is  characteristic  and  exi)ressive,   cor- 
responds to  the  individually  moditied  wills,  to   the  character 
of  particular  individuals/'  (1-121).)     Further,  Schopenhauer 
teaches  that  the  inner   world   in   certain    M()n-temi)oral    and 
eternal  determinations  linds  its  counterpart  in  a  corresjiond- 
incr  series  of  changeless  characteristics  in  the  world  of  space. 
*' The  parts  of  the   body    must    exactly    correspond    to    the 
principal  cravings  through  which  the  wdll    manifests    itself, 
must  be  the  visible   expression    of    the    same:  teeth,    throat 
and  alimentary  canal  are  objectitied  hunger;  the  genitals  ob- 
jectified sexual  desire;  the  grasping  hand,  the  luirrying  foot 
correspond  to  the  more  mediate  strivings  of    the  will,  which 
they    express"     (T-129)       Thus     three     grades    of     paral- 
lelism are  distinctly  outlined.      First,   there  is  a  corres[)ond- 
ence    between    the    individual    acts    of     the    })ersonal     will 
and  the  individual  actions  of    the  body,    secondly,    l)ctwecn 
the  individual  will  as  an  expression  of    an    individual    char- 
acter m  toto  and    the    body    there    is    a    like    parallel;  and 
thirdly,  between  the  wdll  in  its  various  changeless  attributes 
and  the  world  of  sense  as  viewed    in   race    {Gatttfjuj)  char- 
acteristics there  is  also  a  parallel. 

The  doctrine  here  expressed  is    not    original    with    Scho- 
penhauer, but  finds  its  systematic  exposition  in  the   philoso- 


^ 


i 


> 


\ 


P 


m 


phy  of  Spinoza.  For  Spinoza  there  exists  as  the  ground  of 
the  universe  the  Absolute  Substance  wdiich  is  as  with  Scho- 
penhauer the  fV  xal  ndv.  Per  substaatlain  intdJigo  Id 
quod  in  se  est  et  ^^^r  se  conclpHuv;  hoc  cd  id,  cuin.s  con- 
ct'ptuH  7ion  indUjct  coiiceptu  altcrius  vti^  a  (jao  forinan  de- 
hrat''  (Ethics  1.  def.  3) 

Here  is  the  thing-in-itself,  the  suljstance  which  exists  in 
itself,  and  which  to  l)e  known  must  be  conceived  as  indepen- 
dent of  relations.  Of  this  Absolute  Spinoza  maintains  that 
w^e  know  l)ut  two  determinations,  i.  e.  that  of  the  inner  and 
that  of  the  outer  world,  cogltatlo  and  extensio.  Schopen- 
hauer likewise  teaches  that  the  world  as  known  by  us  has 
two  sides;  the  outer  world  of  space  and  the  inner  world 
which  is  primarily  will.  At  this  point  we  see  a  difference 
between  the  two  thinkers,  for  while  Spinoza  considers  the 
all  important  factor  of  the  inner  life  to  l)e  the  intellect, 
Schopenhauer  asserts  the  primacy  of  the  will.  Schopen- 
hauer may  seem  to  differ  from  Spinoza  in  another  important 
particular;  for  while  the  latter  declares  that  God  has 
innumerable  attributes,  tlms  no  one  being  applica])le  to  his 
existence,  the  former  would  assert  that  the  thing-in-itself 
is  capalde  of  a  definite  determination,  i.  e.  it  is  will.  Here, 
however,  the  difference  is  not  so  great  as  might  appear  at 
first  glance.  We  have  already  seen  that  Schopenhauer, 
according  to  one  point  of  view  at  least,  admits  that  we  do 
not  know  the  thing-in-itself  as  it  really  is.  '^The  in-itself 
of  the  world,  which  w^e  think  according  to  the  clearest  of  its 
expressions  under  the  concept  of  will,''  is  yet  as  a  finality 
removed  from  all  determinations  whatsoever.  Spinoza, 
likewise,  while  seeming  to  teach  the  unknowableness 
of  God  as  an  absolute  l)eing,  plainly  gives  to  his  ultimate 
a  character  borrow^ed  from  the  inner  life,  in  as  much  as  the 


/ 


^ 


38 


world-ground  is  related  to  individual  existences  not  causally 
but  logically.  For  Schopenhauer  the  world  is  a  process  of 
will,  for  Spinoza  a  process  of  thought,  a  mathematical  rather 
than  a  dynamical  necessity.  It  follows  from  the  eternal  neces- 
sity of  God's  nature  as  the  angles  of  a  triangle  result  from 
the  nature  of  triangle  itself.  ''E,r  mcc^sltair  dicniae  ndtarae 
hijhilta  ijijinlt^'s  modis  [hoc  f.s7,  omnia  qnnc  suh  Inttllectirm 
Injin'dain  eadere p(>><^unt)  xkjuI  dihcDt/'  (Ethics,  I,  prop. 
16).  From  this  point  on  the  resemblance  between  the 
thought  of  the  two  philosophers  is  most  marked.  ^\q  iind 
Spinoza  setting  forth  an  exact  parallel  between  the  attril)utes 
of  thouirht  and  extension.  For  everv  mode  in  the  inner 
world  there  is  a  corres})onding  mode  in  the  world  of  si)ace. 
''  Ordo  d  connexlo  Ideanun  idvin  cd^  ac  ordo  tt  convcvui 
rerumy  (^Ethics  II;  pr()[)  7. )  Further,  Spinoza  like  Schopen- 
hauer conceives  the  determinations  of  these  two  attril)utes 
iyModi)  under  three  phases.  For  every  act  of  the  body  there 
is  a  corres[)()ndence  in  the  inner  series;  again  the  body  as  a 
whole  has  a  corresponding  idea  connected  with  it,  and  lastly 
there  are  certain  modes  which"  do  not  belonix  to  the  individual 
as  such,  but  to  the  individual  onlv  in  so  far  as  he  is  universal. 
Spinoza  w-ould  teach,  that  the  universal  nature  of  the 
individual  is  his  only  true  and  ade([uate  nature,  just  as 
Schopenhauer  holds  that  it  is  only  the  Platonic  ideas  which 
may  really  be  said  to  exist.  Thus  we  tind  botli  Spinoza  and 
Schopenhauer  denying  ])ersonal  immortality.''  ''It  is  the 
race,''  says  the  latter,  "which  lives  at  all  times.''  The 
former  teaches  that  between  the  human  Ixxlv  and  its  idea 
there  is  a  complete  correspondence;  and  hence  with  the  death 
of  the  body  the  idea  of  the  same  })asses  away.  Correspond- 
ing to  these  three  distinct  grades  of  the  determination  of  the 
Spinozistic  attril)utes  are  three  grades  of  knowledge.      First, 

*  Here  they  are  in  close  agreement  with  Arietotle. 


I 


; 


♦ 


^ 


» f  • 


39 


that  knowledo^e  which  arises  from  the  bodily  affectations;  sec- 
ond,  the  knowledge  of  reason,  and  third,  intuitive  knowledge. 
Schopenhauer  here  fully  agrees  wdtli  his  predecessor. 
Knowledge  first  arises  as  a  slave  to  the  will,  reflective  know- 
ledo^e  is  freed  momentarily  from  its  thraldom,  w^hile  intuitive 
insight  leaves  behind  the  entire  world  of  sense  and  finds  com- 
plete  freedom  in  the  contemplation  of  the  Platonic  idea. 
We  cannot  fail  to  notice  that  the  theory  of  coofnition  here 
involved  differs  essentially  from  the  epistemology  expounded 
in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason.  This  difference  will  asrain 
be  pointed  out  Avhere  its  importance  and  bearing  in  Schopen- 
hauer's philosophy  will  be  more  apparent. 

When  it  is  asked  what  is  for  Spinoza  the  ground  of  the 
parallelism  between  the  attribute  of  extension  and  the  at- 
tribute of  thouijht  the  answer  is  not  difficult.  God  is  the 
bond  of  the  union,  and  in  him  all  differences  find  a  recon- 
ciliation. He  is  the  one  and  the  all,  and  all  modes,  finite 
or  infinite,  owe  their  existence  to  him.  He  is  caum  adoc- 
(juatir  of  the  Avorld.  Likewise  Schopenhauer  declares  that 
the  harmony  and  connection  which  all  parts  of  the  universe 
manifest  should  not  excite  w^onder  for  "it  is,  indeed,  one 
and  the  same  will  w^hich  objectifies  itself  throughout  the 
entire  world."  But  here  it  is  to  be  remem1)ered  that  the 
w^ill  which  Schopenhauer  is  speaking  of  is  the  thing-in-itself , 
the  ultimate,  which  like  Spinoza  he  is  obliged  to  regard  as 
the  source  of  individual  appearance.  When,  however,  he 
is  discussing  the  parallelism  which  exists  between  the  will 
and  the  world  he  is  employing  the  term  in  its  secondary 
sense.  This  will  is  not  unitary  ])ut  appears  in  manifold  in- 
dividual manifestations,  in  the  Platonic  ideas,  the  individ- 
ual characteristics  of  human  beings,  and    in   the    particular 

*  It  is  to  be  remarked  that  this  notion  of    causality  is   rather   logi- 
cal than  dynamic. 


V 


i 


I    i 


40 


41 


phenomena  of  the  world  of  space.  The  parallelism  which 
exists  between  the  outer  and  inner  sides  of  these  various 
manifestations  disp3as3s  for  tho  moment  with  the  causal 
idea.  The  doctrins  of  parallelism,  however,  docs  not  tind 
itself  able  to  entirely  remove  this  notion.  It  places  its 
sphere  of  action  one  step  farther  back,  but  finds  itself  com- 
pelled to  assume  its  ultimate  validity. 

The  crucial  point  in  Spinoza\s  philosophy  appears  when 
the  question  is  asked:  How  is  it  that  the  absolute  sub- 
stance beyond  all  determination  and  free  from  all  change 
and  divisibility  in  itself  bacomes  pheuomenized  and  limi- 
ted? An  attempt  to  picture  this  process  involves  a  dualis- 
tic  conception  of  the  universe.  The  world  falls  apart  into 
natura  naturam  and  natuni  naturata^  notwithstanding  the 
philosopher's  express  denial  of  such  a  division.  This  es- 
sential dualism  shows  itself  with  great  clearness  in  Spino- 
za's Ethics.  Here  we  lind  man  the  partaker  of  the  ntiture 
of  both  these  realms;  in  essence  free,  yet  under  the  s\v;iy 
of  affections  and  passions.  Not  only  is  the  world  of  freedom 
a  cause,  but  the  realm  of  nature  likewise  exercises  a  causal 
influence.  It  is  the  principle  of  darkness  in  the  universe, 
the  source  of  evil  and  illusion.  Schopenhauer,  proceeding 
from  conceptions  similar  to  those  of  Spinoza,  is  met  at  this 
point  by  a  similar  difficulty.  The  problem  is  for  liini  to 
explain  how  the  will  as  thing- in-itself  becomes  a  diversity 
in  the  world  of  space  and  time.  To  solve  this  problem  Scho- 
penhauer employs  the  conception  of  "  Objectivation,"  ^^  1 
understand,"  he  writes  (11-277)  ''by  objectivation  self-ex- 
hibition (das  SichdarsteUen)  in  the  actual  material  world.'' 
Objectivation  of  the  will  is  to  be  viewed  as  the  manifesta- 
tion to  consciousness  of  the  inner  being  of  the  world.  The 
objectified  will  is  the  same  as  the  phenomenized  will.    ''The 


•♦' 


A 


■s  % 


^     i 


t 


K  • 


entire  body  is  nothing  else  than  the  objectified  will,  that  is, 
will  become  idea."  So  we  tind  Schopenhauer  speaking  of 
the  will  as  entering  into  time,  as  manifesting  itself  in  space 
and  as  appearing  under  the  conduct  of  the  causal  law. 
Here  then  is  set  over  against  the  will  as  thing-in -itself  a 
secondary  reality,  namely  the  a  priori  forms  of  thought. 
These  forms  are  however,  dependent  on  the  intellect,  and 
thus  the  world  would  seem  at  this  point  to  divide  itself  into 
will  and  intellect.  Schopenhauer  would  attempt  to  ex- 
plain away  this  dualism  l)y  his  doctrine  of  the  primacy  of 
the  will.  The  intellect  we  are  told,  is  created  1)y  the  will 
for  its  individual  purposes,  since  the  will  is  confronted  by 
hostile  conditions,  and  in  order  to  pursue  its  way  in  secur- 
ity, is  coin})elle(l  to  prepare  a  light  to  illuminate  its  path. 
Such  a  c()ncei)tion,  lunvever,  in  attem})ting  to  do  away  with 
dualism,  substitutes  pluralism.  In  the  place  of  one  will 
there  are  innunicrable,  hostile  forces  tiahtin<r  with  each  other 
for  supremacy.  The  contradictions  involved  in  this  view 
mav  be  sunuuarized  as  follows:  The  will,  which  is  in 
essence  one,  appears  as  a  manifold,  when  the  intellect  ap- 
prehends it  under  the  a  priori  forms  of  space,  time  and 
causality:  but  the  intellect  is  already  a  product  of  the  will 
(which  has  previously  become  individual,  since  the  intellect 
exists  in  order  that  the  special  aims  of  the  individual  will 
may  be  realized  in  opposition  to  the  aims  of  other  contend- 
ing wills. )  Further,  Schopenhauer  asserts  that  these  wills 
tind  tlieir  sole  realization  in  a  world  which  is  hostile  to  them, 
in  as  nuich  as  the  realization  is  always  partial  and  imperfect. 
It  is  in  this  world  that  the  will  tinds  itself  compelled  to 
create  an  intellect  in  order  to  better  obtain  its  aims.  So 
tinally  we  discover  that  it  is  not  the  intellect  but  the  world, 
as    the    necessarv   nriu^   of  the    intellect,  which  is  set   over 


1 ; 


\    i 


^ 


^ 


42 


43 


/ 


acyamst  the  will.  ^'The  world  has  created  itself  without  the 
help  of  the  intellect  which  is  linnted  through  Nature,  lies 
in  it,  belongs  to  it,  and  therefore  cannot  place  itself  over 
against  Nature  as  something  totally  foreign' '  (11-320)'^  Hence 
as  with  Spinoza  the  universe  falls  into  two  })arts,  natura 
naturans  (will)  and  naturanaturata  (Nature.)  Once  more  is 
presented  the  notion  of  the  two  forms  of  causalitv,  the 
transcendent,  timeless;  and  the  temporal,  the  realm  of  Nature 
as  grasped  under  the  concept  of  matter,  "the  visability '' 
(SicAthai'Ji'rit)  of  the  will. 

7.]  It  's  at  this  point  that  Schopenhauer's  thought  most 
evidentlv  and  naturallv  joins  with  the  Kantian  doctrine  of 
the  empirical  and  the  intelligil)le  character.  Scliopenhauer 
attributes  the  highest  importance  to  this  part  of  the  Critical 
Philosophy  and  styles  it  "tlie  greatest  of  all  achievements 
of  human  thought  [Tief>iJiin.)\  "  We  have  here  ''  says 
Lehmann,:}:  "  without  doubt  the  very  ],)oint  before  us,  at 
which  the  system  of  Scliopenliauer  joins  itself  actually  with 
the  Kantian  phil()so})hv,  but  what  Kant  with  foresight  })()s- 
tulated  that  Schoi)enhauer  dogmatically  asserted."  This  ob- 
servation must  be  taken  as  su})stantially  correct;  especially 
important  is  the  latter  part  of  the  statement.  Ktmt's  doc- 
trine is  for  him  only  a  postulate,  an  assum})ti()n  which  helps 
to  explain  certain  diiiiculties,  but  hardly  a  fundamental 
principle  of  the  Critical  Philosophy.  Scliopenhauer,  liow- 
ever,  in  appropriating  it,  develops  and  enlarges  the  con- 
ception, at  the  same  time  employing  it  as  one  of  the  most 
essential  elements  of  his  metipliysics.      This  a  brief    exp;)si- 

*  Here  again  is  to  he  notced  the  materialistic  side  of  vSehopenhaaer's 
doctrine.  The  intellect  is  not  only  secondary  to  the  will,  but  is 
further  simply  a  development  of  matter. 

t  Grand  Prob.  der  Ethik,   p.  176,  Brockhaus  edition. 

X  Rudolf  Lehmanu.  "vScbopenhauer,  eiu  Beitra;^  zur  Psychologie 
der  Metaphysik" 


\ 


i 


\ 


i 


tion  of  the  doctrine,  as  treated  by  Kant    and  by    Schopen- 
hauer, will  show. 

Kant,  like  Spinoza,  conceives  man  as  belonging  to  two 
worlds,  the  world  of  necessity  and  the  world  of  freedom.  In 
the  former  he  is  a  self-determining  being,  in  the  latter  com- 
pletely subjected  to  the  laws  of  mechanical  necessity.  In 
discussing:  the  possibilitv  of  such  freedom  in  harmonv  with 
the  universal  laws  of  natural  necessity,  Kant  says:  ^  "I  term 
that  element  in  a  sensuous  object,  which  is  not  itself  pheno- 
mena, intelligible.  If,  accordingly,  an  object  which  must 
be  regarvled  in  the  world  of  sense  as  phenomenon  possesses 
a  faculty  which  is  not  an  object  of  sensuous  intuition,  but  by 
means  of  which  it  is  capable  of  being  the  cause  of  phenomena, 
the  causality  of  an  object  or  existence  of  this  kind  mav  be 
treatoi  from  two  ditferent  points  of  view,  namely,  as  intellig^i- 
ble  according  to  its  action  as  thing -in-itself;  and  sensuous 
as  regards  its  effects,  as  a  phenomenon  })elonging  to  the  sen- 
suous world.''  In  other  words  Kant  sees  in  everv  ssnsuous 
object,  as  before  pointed  out,  an  evidence  of  the  thinir-in- 
itself.  He  recognizes  here  an  element  which  cannot  be 
attributed  to  the  world  of  phenomena,  since  it  is  utterly 
inex})licable  from  a  priori  rules.  To  this  thing-in-itself  may 
be  attrii)uted,  ''  besides  to  the  property  of  self-phenomeniz- 
ation,  a  ciiusality  whose  effects  are  to  be  met  with  in  the 
phenomenal  world,  although  it  is  not  itself  a  phenomenon.'' 
Beside  beinsf  a  manifestation  of  this  transcendental  cause  the 
object  of  the  senses  is  construable  under  certain  a  priori 
forms,  and  as  such  possesstf^  an  empirical  character  which 
guarantees  "that  its  actions  as  phenomena  stand  throughout 
in  connection,  accordino^  to  unvarvin<]:  natural  laws,  with  all 
other  phenomena.  "  "'"  '"'  "^^  ''  According  to  its  empirical 
character,  this  subject  as  })henomenon  would  be  subordinate 

*  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  p.  423,  Rosenkranz  Edition. 


^ 


44 


to  all  empirical  laws  of  causality,  and  would  be  so  far  noth- 
ing- more  than  a  phenomenon  and  member  of  the  sensuous 
world,  whose  effects  like  all  other  phenomena  continually 
arises'  from  natural  causes.  -^  ^  *  According  to  its 
intelligible  character,  on  the  other  hand,  '•  '"  "  the  subject 
must  be  regarded  as  free  from  all  sensuous  influences  and 
from  all  phenomenal  determinations. '''•  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  Kant  is  here  dealing  with  the  two  separate  notioji^ 
of  causality  which  have  been  previously  discussed,  and  that 
his  distinction  between  empirical  and  intelligible  character  is 
exactly  the  same  as  that  between  temporal  and  n()n-temi)oral 
causality.  The  purpose  of  this  distinction  is  for  Kant 
primarily  to  point  out  a  possible  way  in  which  the  third 
antinomy  with  its  demand  for  both  a  tinal  and  a  temporal 
cause  may  be  satisfied,  and  not  to  maintain  absolutely  that 
such  a  transcendent  cause  exists,  though  his  ethical  theory  linds 
its  chief  support  from  this  sup})osition.  We  must  assume 
that  man  U  free,  says  Kant,  in  order  to  obtain  a  meaning 
f)!- the  cate^rorical  imperative;  but  this  freedom  is  reached 
by  the  practical  rather  than  by  the  theoretical  reason.  Thus 
Kant  would  escape,  when  strictly  interpreted,  from  assert- 
incr,  at  least  doi^maticallv,  the  existence  of  transcendental 
freedom,  and  thus  he  would  seek  to  save  himself  from  falling 
into  complete  contradiction  with  his  epistemology. 

Schopenhauer,  however,  makes  no  such  reservation.  lie 
not  only  accepts  Kant's  doctrine  as  a  working  hypothesis, 
but  raises  it  to  an  absolute  metaphysical  principle  by  the 
aid  of  which  he  seeks  to  set  forth  the  connection  between 
the  thing-in-itself  and  phenomena.  His  method  of  proced 
ure  is  most  clearly  illustrated  in  his  discussion  concernin 
the  will  of  man.  The  individual  will  as  seen  in  its  phenom- 
enal   manifestations   is    capable    of  analysis    into    two    ele- 

♦  Ibid,  p.  423,  244. 


(Y 

to 


I 


♦ 


> 


I 


45 


ments.  One  of  these  Schopenhauer  styles  with  Kant  the 
intelligible  and  the  other  the  empirical  character.  The  in- 
telligible character  finds  its  expression  in  a  permanent  di- 
rection of  the  will,  while  the  empirical  character  mani- 
fests itself  under  the  conduct  of  motives  (a  special  form  of 
the  law  of  occasionalism. )  The  intelligible  character  is  to 
be  treated  as  a  non- temporal,  therefore  as  ^'a  non-divisible, 
unchangeable  act  of  the  will,  whose  phenomenon  sundered 
and  displayed  in  time  and  space  and  in  all  the  forms  of  the 
law  of  sufficient  reason  is  the  empirical  character ''  (1-341. ) 
''These  acts  of  the  will  have  always,  hovrever,  a  ground 
outside  of  themselves  in  the  motives.  Yet  these  (motives ) 
never  determine  anythino:  more  than  that  which  I  will  at  this 
time,  in  this  place  and  under  these  conditions;  not,  how- 
ever, that  I  will  in  general,  nor  what  I  will  in  general,  i.  e. 
the  maxims  which  characterize  my  will  as  a  totality  ;  hence 
mv  will  is  not  accordino^  to  its  entire  nature  to  be  explaiiied 
from  motives  ;  but  these  determine  simply  its  expression  at 
a  given  point  of  time;  the}^  are  simply  the  occasion  through 
which  mv  will  manifests  itself  :  this  (will)  itself,  on  the 
other  hand,  lies  outside  the  province  of  motivation  :  its 
appearance  alone  is  determined  at  every  point  of  time  neces- 
sarily through  this  (law  of  motivation)  "  [1-127]  Thus  tlie 
motive  cannot  be  said  to  determine  the  act  in  itself,  but  only 
its  direction.  It  changes  the  manner  of  the  wilFs  manifesta- 
tion, but  never  the  will  itself.  Therefore  virtue  cannot  be 
taught,  and  therefore  the  special  manifestations  of  the  will 
are  of  no  significance.  It  is  of  like  importance  whether  one 
plays  for  nuts  or  a  crown,  but  that  be  plays— this  is  the 
noteworthy  fact. 

The  doctrine  of  the  intelligible  and  the  empirical  character 
Schopenhauer  applies  not  alone  to  the  will  of  man,  but  he  finds 


^      i 


46 


it  to  be  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  the  thing-in- itself 
in  all  grades  of  its  manifestation.  Examples  are  to  be  found 
in  all  parts  of  nature.  '^  When  the  clouds  move  across  the 
sky  the  figures  which  they  build  are  not  essential  to  them,  are 
for  them  of  equal  importance  ;  but  that  they  as  elastic  vapour 
arc  pressed  together,  driven  about,  extended  and  torn  apart 
by  the  impact  of  the  wind,  this  is  their  nature,  (this)  is  the 
essence  of  the  force  which  o])jectities  itself  in  them,  (this)  is 
the  idea  :  they  are  for  the  individual  ol)server  alone  actual 
figures.  For  the  brook  which  rolls  onward  over  its  })el)bles, 
the  eddies,  waves,  the  fragments  of  foam  which  are  seen  (on 
its  surface)  are  of  e(pial  importance  and  unessential  :  that  it 
obeys  the  law  of  gravity,  preserves  its  nature  as  a  non -elas- 
tic, mobile,  formeless,  transparent  fiuid  ;  this  is  its  essence." 
(1-214).  Thus  Schopenhauer  developos  and  adds  to  the  con- 
caption  of  the  intelligible  and  empirical  character  as  set  forth 
by  Kant.  Depending  as  this  notion  does  at  its  very  incep- 
tion upon  the  fundamental  distinction  between  temporal  and 
non-temporal  causality,  it  in  no  way  avoids  this  distinction 
under  Schopenhauer's  treatment.  Indeed,  the  exposition 
rather  emphasizes  than  weakens  it.  The  will  always  is  rep- 
resented as  the  real  cause  of  its  phenomenal  manifestations  ; 
the 'motive,  the  excitation,  the  Dure  mechanical  action,  as 
the  necessitv  of  Nature,  as  the  occasion  of  individual  occur- 
rence.  Most  sie^nificant  in  this  connection  is  the  followinir  : 
^^It  (the  will)  holds  individuals  fast  fixed  to  this  scene  (of 
action)  and  it  is  \h^  jrrliniiiu  mohlle  of  their  activity,  while 
the  outer  conditions,  the  motives,  determine  simply  the 
direction  of  the  same  in  particulars."  (11-401)).  Schopen- 
hauer doubtless  saw  the  real  nature  of  the  assumption  here 
involved,  but  attempts  to  save  himself  from  inconsistency 
by  limiting  the  application  of  the  causal  law  to  phenomena, 


» 


s 


f 


If 


> 


47 


as  already  pointed  out,  and  thus  by  no  means  excluding  the 
activity  of  transcendental  causality. 

From  another  point  of  view  it  will  be  seen  that  Schopen- 
hauer's conception  of  the  relation  between  the  intelli^nble 
and  empirical  character  involves  the  notion  of  temporal,  occa- 
sional causality  as  well  as  that  of  transcendental  causalitv. 
Scho])enhauer  teaches  that  the  intelligible  character  is  iden- 
tical with  the  original  act  of  the  will  which  reveals  itself  in 
the  empirical  character.  What,  then,  is  the  nature  of  this 
iict  of  the  will  ?  In  the  inorganic  world  it  api)ears  as  a 
l)ower  of  nature  and  this  suggests  the  identification  of  the 
intelligible  character  with  the  conception  of  force  in  general. 
Schopenhauer,  however,  hastens  to  declare  that  such  a  notion 
is  inadeipiate,  since  force  is  but  a  special  form  of  the  will 
and  is  (jualitas  occulta.  We  find  that  the  will,  which  as  has 
already  been  shown,  is  at  the  outset  as  thing-in-itself  purely 
a  negative  principle,  obtains  a  positive  determination  by  its 
identification  with  impulse  [Trleh)^  desire  {Drang)^  lontrino- 
{Sehnmcht).-  The  will  manifests  itself  "as  a  tireless 
mechanism  (Truilnt'erk)^  an  unconscious  impulse  "  (11-409). 
The  notion  of  the  will  as  universal  desire  is  not  in  itself  suf- 
ficient, however,  to  definitely  characterize  the  thing-in-itself. 
Desire  must  be  desire  for  something,  otherwise  the  universe 
would  remain  in  a  purely  static  condition.  In  vain  Schopen- 
hauer protests  that  the  will  in  general  has  no  aim.  '^In 
fact  there  is  an  absence  of  everv  aim,  of  all  limits  in  the 
being  of  the  will  in  itself,  which  is  an  endless  striving  "  (I- 
195).  Notwithstanding  this  express  statement  to  the  con- 
trary, the  will  has  the  most  distinct  of  aims,  for  it  is  the 
will  to  live.f     Yet  there  is  not  one  will  to  live  but  manv, 

*cf.  I-140 

t  The  importance  of  this  principle  will  be  more  fully  discussed  when 
Schopenhauer's  relation  to  Aristotle  is  considered. 


i 


48 


49 


and  hence  arise  the  distinctions  in  the  intelligible  character 
of  men  and  of  the  lower  objectitications   of  the  will.      All 
seek  for  self-realization  ;  hence  the  strife  and  misery  of  the 
world ,  hence  the  ethical    need   of  self-reniinciati<m.      Here 
we  find  Schopenhauer  characterizing  the  thing  in-itself  })y  a 
principle    taken    without    reservation   from   the  phenomenal 
world  ;  for  life  is  the  characteristic  of  temporal  existence, 
beyond  which  and  its  illusion  there  is  alone  rest,  since  there 
alone  life  ceases.      Farther,  there   are  countless  conilicting 
^yills— demonic  forces  which  seek  to  rend  each  other  in  order 
that  they  may  subsist  but  the  spice  of  a  day^s  dream.      Once 
again  in  the  notion  of  the  will  has  thething-in-itself  vanished. 
The    ev  nai  Ttdv   is  after  all   only   itav.      The    will     thus 
degraded  involves  essentially   the   conception  of  time,  first 
because  it  is  conceived  as  mere  longing    or  desire  after  that 
which  it  does  not  possess  and   which  it   strives   to  obtain. 
"The  basis  of  all   willing   is   need,  want''  (I-;3t;T).      Like- 
wise, the  notion  of  many  wills  seeking  with  varying  fortunes 
to  realize  themselves,  and   ever  striving  to  mount  higher  in 
the  scale  of  being  can  alone  ])e  pictured  s*ih  sj}rr/\>  ti'iiijyyris. 
Thus  it  is  clear  that  the  intelligible  character  as  cause  of  the 
individual   acts  of  the  empirical   character  is  at   this  point 
conceived  as  temporally   determined.      It   must  likewise   be 
observed  that  the  causal  notion  here   involved   contains  in  it 
a  teleological  element,  since  the  will,  though  unconsciously 
according  to  Schopenhauer,  moves  toward  an   end.      Hence 
bis  treatment  of  the  relation  between  the   intelligil)le    and 
empirical  character    must    be  viewed  under    two  heads,  first 
that  of  transcendent  causality   (already  implicit    in  Kant's 
conception)   and   second  that  of  immanent  teleology  which 
does  not  rise  above  the  world  of  phenomena.      The  teleologi- 
cal notion,  however,  relates    itself  closely  to  the  doctrine  of 


^ 


i 


I 


^ 


t 


the  Platonic  iaea  which  forms  a  most  essential  part  of  Scho- 
penhauer's system. 

8.]    Although  Schopenhauer's  doctrine  of  the  idea  may  be 
regarded  as  an   attempt  to   furnish  a   mediating   principle 
between  the  worlds  of  Being  and  of  Becoming,   it  must  be 
remembered  that  for  Plato  it  was  rather  an  epistemoiogical 
than  a  metaphysical  need  which  prompted  him  to  philosophize. 
Likewise  Schopenhauer  may  be  understood  at  this  stage  of 
his  thouirht  as  seekinoj  in  the  first  instance  for  a  knowledtre 
of  reality    rather  than    as  attempting  to    construct    a   sure 
bridge  between  the  world  of  ovala  and  the  world  of  yeveo'i?. 
Both  Plato  and  Schopenhauer  are  convinced  of  the  unreality 
of  the  present  life.     Here  all  is  relativity   and  true  knowl- 
edf^e   can  never  be  attained;  yet  neither  philosopher  can  be 
content  with  such  a  world.     True  knowledge  must  be  sought 
in  order  that  the  practical  demands  may  be  satisfied.      '  'If  the 
world  was  not  something  that,   practically  expressed,    ought 
not  to  be,   it  would  not  be  a  theoretical  problem,"  (11-664). 
Plato  strives  for  a  solid  foundation  for  ethics,  while  Schopen- 
hauer recognizes  the  necessity  of  knowing  reality  in  order  to 
satisfy  the  religious  aspirations.      "Temples  and  churches, 
pagodas  and  mosques,  in  all  lands,  at  all  times,  in  splendor  and 
grandeur,  testify  to  the  metaphysical  need  of  humanity, "  (H- 
177).      In  attributing  an  eternal  truth  to  the  Platonic  ideas, 
and  in  ascribing  to  man  under  the  most  favorable  circum- 
stances an  ability    to    apprehend  this     truth,    Schopenhauer 
clearly  abandons  his  contention  that  truth  is  such  only  in 
relation  and  asserts  that  the  human  mind  can  grasp  the  trans- 
cendent apart  from  its  phenomenal    character.       We   have 
already  pointed  out  this  change  in  Schopenhauer's  theory  of 
knowledge  when  discussing  his  relation  to  Spinoza;  and  here 
the  full  importance  of  the  doctrine  can  be  estimated,   since 


\ 


< 


50 


without  this  revised  epistemology  Schopenhauer  would  have 
been  unable  to  maintain  his  connection  with  Plato.  To  this 
intuitive  knowledge  of  the  non-sensuous  the  Scholastics  and 
Mystics  would  have  subscribed,  and  for  this  the  much 
despised  Hegel  would  have  contended,  ' '  The  only  content 
which  can  be  held  to  be  the  truth,"  writes  Hegel  (Logic, 
§74),  *^is  one  not  mediated  with  something  else,  not  limited 
by  other  things;  or  otherwise  expressed  it  is  one  mediated 
by  itself,  where  mediate  and  immediate  reference  to  self 
coincide. ' '  ^  This  absolute  knowledge  is  what  Plato  evidently 
seeks  in  his  attempt  to  ground  ethics,  and  this  is  the  knowl- 
edge which  Schopenhauer  must  extol  in  so  far  as  he  follows 
the  teachings  of  Plato.  True,  this  intuitive  knowledge  has 
for  Schopenhauer  a  certain  relativity,  since  to  know  is  to 
have  an  object  of  knowledge  which  requires  as  its  antithesis 
a  subject.  Hence  it  is  that  he  declares  that  the  Platonic 
ideas  do  not  reveal  the  thing-in -itself  but  only  its  ade(piate 
objection.  Yet  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  the  Platonic 
ideas  reveal  the  true  nature  of  the  phenomenal  world,  t  and 
the  distinction  cannot  be  held  to  be  of  great  importance. 
Over  aorainst  the  knowledo^e  of  the  eternal  ideas  is  set  that 
of  the  senses,  which  becomes  confused  and  muddy  througli 
entrance  into  a  material  medium.  It  is  difficult  here  to 
believe  that  we  are  considering  the  doctrine  of  an  avowed 
follower  of  Kant.  This  is  rather  the  epistemology  of  Leib- 
niz than  that  of  the  author  of  the  Critical  Philosophy. 

The  strong  emphasis  which  Plato  gives  to  the  phenome- 
nal character  of  the  world  of  sense,  and  the  ecpially  strong 
affirmation  of  this  doctrine    by    Schopenhauer    cause    both 

*  Translation  by  Wallace,  Oxforo  1892. 

t  This  such  passages  as  the  following  show: 

"  Nicht  die  mir  vorschwebende  raumliche  Gestalt,  sondern  der  Aus- 
druck,  die  reine  Bedeutung  derselben,  t'Ar  innerstes  Wesen,  das  sich 
mir  aufschliesst,  und  mich  anspricht  ist  eigentlich  die  Idee,"  (I-247). 


\       i       ^ 


k 


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*     •  51 

philosophers  to  place  a  seemingly  light  value  upon  this 
realm;  and  thus  their  teaching  is  confronted  with  the  dan- 
ger of  a  reduction  to  pure  Eliatism  ;  yet  while  the  world 
is  declared  to  be  an  illusion  and  to  have  only  a  relative  ex- 
istence, it  must  be  remembered  that  this  illusion  and  this 
relativity  are  such  for  thought.  In  no  sense  can  an  illusion 
be  said  to  be  non-existent,  and  the  consistent  philosopher, 
far  from  io-norinor  it,  is  forced  to  recognize  its  presence  and 
to  attempt  to  relate  it  to  the  clearer  but  no  more  existent 
realm  of  truth.  The  importance  of  this  fact  should  have 
especially  appealed  to  Schopenhauer,  who  as  a  disciple  of 
Kant  rejoiced  in  the  death  blow  given  to  the  old  time  ontol- 
ogy'^ There  are  no  grades  of  being,  for  "  being  is  evi- 
dently not  a  real  predicate,  "f  Phenomena  cannot  then  be 
explained  away  but  must  be  connected  with  noumena.  But, 
as  has  already  been  said,  Plato  was  not  in  the  first  instance 
concerned  with  this  connection,  while  Schopenhauer's  posi- 
tion in  so  far  as  he  agrees  with  Plato,  may  be  treated  as 
epistemological  rather  than  metaphysical.  Yet  out  of  Pla- 
to's epistemology  a  metaphysics  arose,  the  outlines  of  which 
he  himself  indicated,  and  which  was  developed  to  a  greater 
richness  and  fullness  by  Aristotle.  Schopenhauer,  too, 
finds  a  metaphysical  side  for  the  doctrine  of  the  idea  and 
enlarges  it  beyond  the  bounds  of  Plato's  teaching.  Hence 
it  becomes  necessary  to  consider  more  closely  the  Philoso- 
phy of  Idealism  as  expounded  by  its  founder  and  as  inter- 
preted by  Schopenhauer.     . 

That  Plato  intended  to  give  to  his  ideas  something  more  than 

"VDaherTsTder  Begriff  der  ''Vollkommenheit,"  wenn  schlechthiu 
und  in  abstracto  gebraucht,  ein  gedankenleeres  Wort,  und  ebecso  das 
Gerede  vom  ''Allervollkommensten  Wesen"  u.  dgl.  m.  Das  Alles  1st 
blosser  Wortkram.  [Kritik  der  Kantischen  Philosophic;  (1-503)-] 

t  Compare  Kant's  discussion  of  the  Ontological  Argument,  Critique 
of  Pure  Rea^>on,  Trans.  Dialectic,  Book  ii.,  Chapt  in  ,  §  4- 


i 


r  'i 


— .« 


52 


1^ 


a  purely  logical  existence  there  can  be  no  doubt.  The  idea 
must  be  understood  as  a  reality  whose  being  is  in  no  way 
dependent  on  individual  thought,  though  it  is  cast  in  thought 
forms  in  so  far  as  these  forms  are  universal.  The  idea  is  an 
abiding  essence  beyond  space  and  time,  on  the  one  hand 
pointing  to  an  al)solute  above  it,  and  on  the  other  shadowing 
forth  its  being  in  the  world  of  phenomena.  In  this  respect 
Schopenhauer's  doctrine  is  entirely  in  accord  with  that  of 
Plato.  The  wall  as  adeipiately  objectiticd  knows  no  growth 
and  no  decay.  Ideas  are  ^'the  permanent,  changeless  forms 
independent  of  the  temporal  existence  of  individuals,  sjjccies 
rerum,  which  properly  constitute  the  purely  objective  in  phe- 
nomena "  (11-416).  As  has  been  pointed  out,  however,  Scho- 
penhauer does  not  find  in  these  ideas  the  thing-in-itself.  They 
'  are  the  forms  in  which  the  final  essence  is  revealed  to  knowl- 
edore  ;  yet  they  are  of  a  permanent  and  abiding  worth  in  them- 
selves. Plato's  doctrine,  at  least  in  its  final  stage  of  develop- 
ment, must  be  interpreted  as  in  agreement  with  that  of 
Schopenhauer.  The  ideas,  though  eternal,  are  not  a})solute; 
behind  them  is  the  deity  with  whom  these  ideas  nuist  enter 
into  union.  But  how  is  such  a  union  possi!)le;  liow^  can  God, 
whom  Plato  conceives  as  absolute  reason,  combine  in  himself 
ideas  seemingly  of  the  most  heterogeneous  and  conflicting 
nature  ?  Plato's  answer  to  this  question,  if  definitely 
expressed,  would  be  that  the  ideas  are  not  ecpial  in  rank  ; 
[  some  are  subordinated  to  others,  and  between  the  lowest  and 
,  the  highest  there  is  a  series  ever  mounting  toward  the  idea 
'  of  the  Good.  Thus  the  connection  and  arrangement  of  the 
ideas  involves  unmistakably  the  notion  of  an  end.  The 
world  of  Being  exhibits  an  eternal  arrangement  of  ideas 
unified  through  a  teleological  ordering  of  the  whole.  Thus 
Plato  would    explain    the  relation  of  his  ideal  world  to  the 


I 


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53 


Absolute,  the  World  Reason.  The  problem  still  remains  to 
connect  this  world  with  phenomena.  This  relation  is  far 
from  clear,  and  only  the  general  direction  of  the  philosopher's 
thinkinor  can  be  indicated.  It  is  evident  that  since  the  ideas 
themselves  are  subjected  to  no  change,  they  cannot  be  con- 
sidered as  the  cause  of  the  world  of  sense  in  so  far  as  it  is 
conceived  as  pure  becoming.  A  secondary  principle  must 
be  introduced,  and  this  we  find  in  Plato's  conception  of 
em})ty  space  (yu//  ov^).  This  is  a  sul)sidiary  cause  and  may 
be  viewed  as  matter  which  a  world-forming  God  moulds 
according  to  the  ideas.  Here  all  ends  in  allegory  and 
mysticism;  no  scientific  conception  is  offered  as  to  the  rela- 
tion between  phenomena  and  the  Avorld  of  essences  :  yet  the 
unmistakable  character  of  this  union  so  faintly  shadowed 
forth  is  teleological. 

At  first  glance  Schopenhauer  w^ould  seem  to  be  debarred 
from  placing  a  teleological  principle  in  his  universe,  since 
he  most  explicitly  declares  that  the  intellect  is  secondary  to 
tlie  will  and  purely  a  product  of  the  phenomenal  world. 
The  discussion  of  this  question  belongs  more  properly  to 
the  consideration  of  Schoi)enhauer's  system  in  so  far  as  it 
accords  with  Aristotle's  philosophy:  here  it  is  sufficient  to 
point  out  that  Schopenhauer  pictured  the  ideas  as  arranged 
according-  to  a  hierarchy:  and  that  since  he  declares  that  be- 
tween  them  there  exists  no  temporal  relation,  the  determin- 
ing factor  in  this  arrangement  must  be  sought  as  a  logical  and 
teleological  one  in  which  exists  a  gradation  according  to 
some  end.  "  Every  general,  original  power  of  nature," 
says  Schopenhauer,  ' '  is  in  its  innermost  being  nothing  else 
than  the  o])jectivation  of  the  will  at  a  low  grade;  we  call 
such  a  irrade  an  eternal  idea  in  Plato's  sense."  (1-159.)  '^At 
the  higher  grades  of  the   objcctivation    of  the    will   we    see 


( 


54 


individuality  significantly  make   its   appearance."     (1-155) 
What  Schopenhauer  considers  as  the  determining    factor    in 
the  arrangement  of  the  ideas  will    later  be   more   fully    dis- 
cussed.    For  the  moment  it  suffices  to  remark  that  a  distinct 
teleological  notion  is   involved   in   the   connection    of  these 
ideas   with    the    absolute    princii)le    under    which  they  fall. 
Concerning  the  nature  of  the  relation  between  the  ideas  and 
the  phenomenal  world  Schopenhauer  is  much   more    explicit 
than  Plato.     In  so  far  as  the  ideas  are    identified    with    the 
intelligible  character  the  relation  has   already    been    consid- 
ered.    Schopenhauer,  like  Plato,  is  obliged  to  conceive    the 
subsidiary,  yet  independent  existence  of   a  secondary  cause, 
which  serves  as  the  medium    for    the  partial    reabzation    of 
the  ideas  as  well  as  furnishing  the    reason   of    their    inade- 
quate expression  in  the  world  of  sense.      Schopenhauer  also 
asserts  with  Plato  that  the  world  is  a  faint  copy  of  the  ideas. 
^ a  understand,"  he  says  (1-151:)   ''by  idea   every    definite 
and  changeless  grade  of  the  objectivation  of  the  will,   in    so 
far  as  it  is  thing-in-itself,  and  hence   removed   from    nudti- 
plicity;  these    grades    relate    themselves    to    the    individual 
things  altogether  as  their  eternal  forms  or  patterns  (Muster- 
bilder)"     This  is,   however,    simply   the    statement   of   the 
problem,  not   its  answ^er.       The   (juestion    is,    what   is   the 
irround  of  the  resemblance  between  the  ideas  and  the  changing 
forms  of  the  phenomenal  world?     Plato,  we  have  seen,    of- 
fers no  real  solution.      It  remained  for  his   follower,    Aris- 
totle, to  carry  on  and  com})lete  the  work  begun;  hence    ])e- 
fore  considering  Schopenhauer's  attempt  at  solving  the  prob- 
lem, it  becomes  necessary  to  review  in  outline  the  system  of 
the  great  Stagirite  which  although  it  posesses  no    historical 
connection  with  Schopenhauer's  philosoi)hy,  yet  exhi])its  an 
important  pragmatic  relation  to  it. 


f 


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55 


9.  ]  The  solution  which  Aristotle  gives  to  the  problein  raised 
by  Plato's  philosophy  (i.  e.,  the  relation  between  the  ideas 
and  the  phenomenal  world)  may  be  stated  as  follows:  He 
removes  from  the  idea  its  quality  of  transcendence  and  sets 
forth  a  metaphysics  of  immanence.  The  ideas  exist,  but 
not  apart  from  this  world;  they  are  the  essences  which  re- 
alize themselves  in  matter.  But  this  realization  is  in  time, 
since  its  form  is  that  of  development.  Hence  the  ideas  lose 
much  of  their  noumenal  reality  and  take  upon  themselves 
the  qualities  of  the  world  of  sense.  As  the  organ  develops 
to  its  perfection,  so  the  kernel  in  the  unformed  matter  seeks 
more  and  more  to  realize  itself.  Not  only  does  a  unitary 
plan  manifest  its  workinirs  in  the  (jrow^th  of  individual 
things,  but  also  Nature  as  a  whole  must  be  viewed  as  a 
realm  of  connected  and  ordered  parts  whose  forms  rise  even 
higher  and  higher  toward  the  deity,  the  transcendent  prm- 
cij^le  in  Aristotle's  universe.  The  deity  itself  is  the  pure 
form  which  does  not  enter  into  matter,  while  all  other 
forms  find  their  ex})ression  alone  in  the  physical  w^orld. 
Hence  there  are  two  w^orld  principles  for  Aristotle:  one 
that  of  the  inunanent  forms  w^hich  continually  seek  to  come 
to  expression,  the  other  that  of  the  transcendent  cause,  actus 
puru^,  the  immoved  mover  who  draws  all  to  himself. 
Thus  the  universe  must  be  viewed  as  the  result  of  two 
causes,  that  of  tenq^oral  and  of  transcendental  teleology. 
Later  the  transcendental  notion  of  teleolof^v  will  be  found 
to  assume  the  greater  importance  for  us,  where  it  forms  the 
basis  for  the  most  consistent  ex))ression  of  Schopenhauer's 
doctrine,  namely  in  his  philosophy  of  ethics  and  religion. 

Turninof  our  attention  for  the  moment  to  the  immanent 
side  of  Aristotle's  system,  we  find  that  apparently  it  con- 
flicts with  the  most  fundamental  principles  of  Schopenhauer's 


I 


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V  '4 
67 


teachings.  Nowhere  are  we  brought  more  clearly  to  recog- 
nize the  insuperable  obstacles  which  Schopenhauer  attempts 
to  overcome  than  at  this  stage  of  his  thought;  hence  we  shall 
not  be  surprised  to  find  that  the  fourtli  book  of  the  ''  Workl 
as  Will  and  Idea"  in  a  measure  frees  itself  from  the  presup- 
positions of  its  earlier  cha})ters,  while  pointing  to  the  only 
conclusion  in  regard  to  the  solution  of  the  relation  between 
the  world  and  its  absolute  principle  which  it  was  {)()ssible 
from  the  outset  to  reach, — namely  that  a  detinite  knowledge 
of  such  a  relation  is  impossible,  since  the  thing-in-itself  is 
purely  a  negative  and  limitative  concept.  The  ))()ints  at 
which  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  seems  most  evidently  to 
conflict  with  Aristotle's  system  may  be  thus  summarized  : 

I.  Schopenhauer  ascribes  to  the  ideas  an  existence  above 
the  world  of  sense,  while  Aristotle  denies  their  reality  apart 
from  phenomena. 

II.  Schopenhauer  declares  that  the  ideas  require  a 
special  faculty  for  their  apprehension,  while  Aristotle  sees 
the  only  sphere  of  their  exhibition  in  the  visible  and  tangi- 
ble universe. 

III.  Schopenhauer  regards  the  process  of  history  as 
unmeaning,  while  for  Aristotle  time  in  essential,  since  the 
pure  forms  reach  adequate  expression  by  development. 

IV.  Schopenhauer  asserts  that  the  intellect  is  only  of  a 
secondary  and  relative  importance,  while  the  logical  and 
teleological  elements  in  Aristotle's  philosophy  are  primary. 

Schopenhauer,  however,  by  no  means  holds  to  these  prin- 
ciples, and  in  his  development  of  the  doctrine  of  the  ideas  he 
assumes  a  position  intimately  related  to  the  Philosophy  of 
Immanence.  ''I  say,  therefore,''  writes  Schopenhauer 
(Kritik  der  Kantischen  Philosophic,  1-507)  ''that  the  solu- 
tion of  the  riddle  of  the  world  must  proceed  from  an  under- 


^ 


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standing  of  the  world  itself;  that  therefore  the  problem  of 
metaphysics  is  not  to  soar  above  experience  in  which  the 
world  stands  forth,  but  to  understand  it  completely,  shiee 
experience,  outer  and  inner,  i^certahdy  tlte  principal  source 
of  all  knowJcdgey  Likewise  (11-203):  "It  (metaphysics) 
remains  immanent  and  does  not  become  transcendent." 
Again  (11-730):  "  my  philosophy  ''■  -  -  -  does  not  attempt 
'••  "  '"  to  explain  the  being  of  the  world  according  to  its  final 
principle;  it  rather  stops  at  the  facts  of  outer  and  inner 
experience,  as  they  are  accessable  to  every  one,  and  shows 
the  true  and  deep  connection  of  the  same,  yet  without  indeed 
going  out  to  any  supermundane  objects  and  their  relation  to 
the  world.  It  affords  no  conclusion,  therefore,  to  that 
existing  beyond  all  i)ossible  experience,  but  offers  simply 
the  exposition  of  the  given  in  the  outer  world  and  in  self- 
consciousness,  contents  itself,  therefore,  with  grasping  the 
being  of  the  world  according  to  the  inner  connection  with 
itself.  It  is  consequently  immanent  in  the  Kantian  sense  of 
the  word."  Thus  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  fails  to  reach 
the  transcendent.  At  this  point  it  may  further  be  observed 
that  the  will  (the  so-called  thing-in-itself)  has  only  a  phe- 
nomenal existence.  This  a  ])rief  consideration  of  Schopen- 
hauer's own  statements  will  show.  The  will,  as  has  been 
seen,  is  the  will-to-live.  "So  it  is  the  same  thing  and  only 
a  })leonism,  if  instead  of  saying  simply  » the  will '  we  say 
'  the  will-to-live' "  (1-424)  In  other  words  wall  and  life 
are  so  intimatelv  bound  too:ether  that  where  there  is  no  life 
there  is  iikew^ise  no  will.  On  the  other  hand,  this  phe- 
nomenal existence  "as  inseparably  accompanies  the  will 
as  the  shadow  accompanies  its  body,  and  if  there  is 
will  there  wdll  also  be  life,  (there  will  also  ])e)  the 
world"    (1-324.)     Further,    it   appears    in    Schopenhauer's 


5 
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58 


59 


ethical  and  religious  doctrines,  that  with  the  denial 
of  the  will-to-live  not  only  life  ceases  but  also  the  will 
itself,  for  the  two  must  stand  and  fall  together,  '^  No  will  : 
no  idea,  no  world."  Thus  the  will  and  its  adeciuate  object- 
tivation,  the  Platonic  ideas,  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as 
transcendent,  but  bound  to  space  and  time  and  cxistentent 
alone  in  the  phenomenal  world.  This  clearly  is  the  Aristotelian 
development  of  the  philosoi)hy  of  idealism.  Since  the  will 
and  the  ideas  are  no  longer  to  be  regarded  as  siii)ernum(hine 
entities  it  naturally  follows  that  they  ex[)ress  themselves  in 
the  world  and  do  not  require  a  special  faculty  of  intuition 
for  their  apprehensicvn.  Scliopcnhauer  can  no  longer  con- 
tend that  ''the  will  is  toUxjinevr  different  from  idea''  (phe- 
nomenal world.)  Rather  the  entire  world  of  sense  is  '-  only 
the  objectivation,  the  mirror  oi  the  will(^l-315),  and  ''to  the 
nature  of  the  will  its  phenomena  nuist  exactly  correspond'' 
(11-679.)  Hence  the  study  of  i)hen()mena  nuist  reveal  the 
true  nature  of  their  essence.  For  example:  ^'In  order  com- 
pletely to  grasp  the  ideas  which  manifest  themselves  in  wa- 
ter, it  is  not  sufficient  to  see  it  in  the  still  pool,  or  the  even 
flowinty  stream;  but  those  ideas  comi)letelv  reveal  them- 
selves  first,  when  the  water  appears  under  all  i)ossible  con- 
ditions and  obstructions,  which  acting  upon  it  cause  it  to 
fully  express  all  its  characteristics"  (1-29 T).  Since  the 
ideas  are  bound  up  so  closely  with  phenomena  the  time  fac- 
tor can  not  be  regarded  as  unimportant,  and  the  entire 
world  process  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  "The 
idea  of  mankind,  if  it  was  to  appear  in  its  ai)propriate  sig- 
nificance, might  not  present  itself  alone  and  unconnected, 
but  had  to  be  attended  downwards  stej)  by  stej)  through  all 
the  forms  of  the  animal  world,  through  the  kingdom  of 
plants  to  that  of  inorganic  life;  they  all    act  supplementary 


4 


S 


i 


S 


I 


to  each  other  for  the  complete  objectivaiion  of  the  will: 
the  idea  of  humanity  as  necessarily  presupposes  them,  as 
the  blossoms  of  the  tree  presuppose  the  leaves,  the  branch, 
the  trunk  and  the  root:  they  form  a  pyramid  whose  summit 
is  man."  (1-182).  This  intimate  connection  between  all  parts 
of  the  world  makes  history  of  the  highest  importance.  It 
is  no  lono:er  a  mere  dream  and  delusion.  "  What  reason  is 
to  the  individual  that  is  historvto  the  human  race  '*  (11-508. ) 
Yet  more  important  is  the  consideration  that  the  whole 
world,  l)ound  inseparably  as  it  is  with  the  temporal  notion, 
is  the  scene  of  the  denial  of  the  w-ill,  an  historical  event  of 
transcendent  significance.  Thus  the  will  appears  as  limited 
in  time  and  its  extinction  becomes  the  goal  of  practical  en- 
deavor. 

Schopenhauer,  thus  completely  in  accord  with  Aristotle 
in  placing  the  Platonic  ideas  under  temporal  conditions,  like- 
wise agrees  with  him  in  his  conception  of  the  teleological 
character  of  the  relation  between  phenomena  and  the  ideas 
which  manifest  themselves  therein,  although  such  an  agree- 
ment may  seem  to  come  into  the  sharpest  conflict  witli 
Schopenhauer's  contention  that  we  are  prohibited  from  ap- 
plying the  notion  of  an  end  to  nature  as  a  whole  which  is 
the  jjri us  of  all  intellectuality.  "  We  are  in  no  way  justi- 
fied to  apply  our  limitations  to  Nature  which  is  itself  a  ^^/vVx 
of  all  intellect,  and  whose  workings  are  from  ours  ""  '' 
totally  different.  She  brings  into  existence  the  api)arently 
purposive  and  planned  without  thought  and  without  the  no- 
tion of  an  end,  because  without  an  idea  the  origin  of  which 
is  completely  secondary"  (11-373)  In  vain  w^ould  Schopen- 
hauer contend  that  the  teleological  notion  is  purely  heuristic 
in  its  character;  that  it  is  an  idea  which  the  intellect  reads 
into  the  world.      "  The  purposiveness  of  the  organism  exist 


\ 


I 


60 


simply  for  the  reason  which  recognizes  it."   (TI-373)       Not- 
withstanding this  explicit    denial    of    a  more    than    su))ject- 
ive   validity     to     the     teleological    notion,     Schopenhauer 
clearly   pictures   the  world    objectively    considered    under 
thought  determinations,  since  he,   as  already  said,  arranges 
the  Platonic  ideas,  the  adequate   objectivation  of  the   thing- 
in-itself,  according  to  a  teleological  principle.     Further,  the 
will  shows  a  tendency  to  realize  itself  in  a  workl  of  j)henom- 
ena  and  creates  the  individual  intellect    that    it    may    Ik  iter 
succeed^  although  we  are  told  that  it  is  a    com[)letely    blind 
principle  without  aim.      By  this  we  are  doubtless  to  under- 
stand that  the  will  has  no  rational    end;  one    that    could    be 
justified  by  the  highest  wisdom  and  widest    exj)ericncc.       It 
certainly  has  the  most  definite  of  aims,  that  of  living  and  of 
living,  too,  in  a    certain    definite    and    determined    manner. 
Schopenhauer  must  be  understood  as  admitting  the    validity 
of  the  teleological  notion  in  the  realm  of  nature.     Lucretius, 
Bacon  and  Spinoza  have  denied  it,  but  wrongly  and  l)ecause 
they  considered    it    inseparable  from    speculative    theology. 
'*  Spinoza  did  not  know  how  to  help  himself   in    any    other 
manner,  than  through  the  desperate    expedient    of   denying 
teleology  itself,  therefore  purposiveness  in  the  works  of  na- 
ture, a  contention  whose  monstrosity  is  apparent    to    every- 
one who  has  obtained  an  exact  knowled^^e  of  orii:anic  nature. 
*         *         ^     In  comparison    with  these   philosoi)hers   of 
Modern   Times     Aristotle    appears   to   a   great   advantage 
who    just  at  this  point  shows  himself  in    a  most    favorable 
light."    (11-388).      Thus    Schopenhauer    agrees    with   Aris- 
totle's    principle   of     immanent    teleology,    finding     indis- 
putable evidence  of  its  domain  just  where  the  great    teacher 
of  Antiquity  discovered  it,  namely    in    the    organic    world. 
Schopenhauer  pictures  the    whole    physical    universe    under 


i 


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♦ 


s 


\ 


> 


61 


the  symbol  of  organic  life.  It  is  the  unfolding  of  the  will- 
to-live  and  agrees  in  its  various  parts.  Yet  the  teleology 
which  ^t  bears  evidence  of  is  conceived  as  possible  without 
intelligence.  Though  "in  fact  we  cannot  clearly  think  of  a 
final  cause  [Endursachc)  otherwise  than  as  an  end  corteni- 
plated,  that  is  as  a  motive;"  yet  'nf  vvc  closely  ol)serve  the 
final  causes  in  nature,  we  must,  in  order  to  express  their 
transcendent  beinir,  not  fear  a  contradiction,  and  1x)ldlv 
state:  fnal  caune  is  a  utotlve  trlilcli  v:ovhs  upon  a  h'-iVKi^  hnt 
Is  not  recognized  Ijy  //."  (11-378)  The  will  is  related  to 
the  world  through  the  principle  of  unconscious  theolog}'. 
This  principle,  moreover,  as  with  Aristotle,  centres  in  tlie 
ideas  which  seek  self-realization  {.^uu/n  esse  conservarc). 
"The  idea,  or  the  species  is  that  wherein  the  will  to  live  as 
a  matter  of  fact  roots  itself  and  manifests  itself"  ^11-552  i. 
Thus  the  will-to-live  becomes  the  end  as  it  is  the  cause  and 
essential  exj)ression  {i.iopcpij)  of  l)eing.  But  how  far  this 
will  is  removed  from  the  thino^-in-itself  which  knows  no  re- 
lation  and  is  completely  sundered  from  the  phenomenal 
world!  As  already  pointed  out,  this  will  of  vrhich  Scho- 
penhauer is  here  speaking  realizes  itself  alone  in  the  world 
of  sense  and   must    rise    and    decay    with    phenomena. 

A  comparison  of  the  manner  in  which  Aristotle  and  Scho- 
penhauer developed  the  notion  of  temporal  teleology  in  the 
physical  universe  is  not  without  interest.  Schopenhauer 
finds  three  principal  grades  of  the  ol^jectivation  of  the  will, 
ramely  in  the  inorganic  realm  of  mechanical  necessity: 
in  the  realm  of  vegetable  life,  where  mechanical  neces- 
sity is  replaced  by  the  law  of  irritability  in  the  growth 
and  development  of  the  plant,  and  finally  in  the  realm 
of  sentient  life,  where  the  will  appears  under  the 
guidance    of    motives.       Similarly     Aristotle    distinguishes 


♦ 


s 


I 


i 


62 


I » 

i 


63 


between  the  mechanical  causation  of  inorganic  nature 
and  the  causation  which  first  displays  itself  in  organic 
life,  namely  in  the  plant  world,  in  the  animal  king- 
dom, and  finally  in  the  life  of  human  beings.  The  lower 
forms  with  him  as  with  Schopenhauer  are  necessary  for  the 
existence  and  activities  of  the  higher.  This  interesting  gra- 
dation of  inorganic  and  living  matter  according  to  the  ideas 
which  seek  to  express  themselves  finds  also  its  parallel  in 
the  natural  philosophy  of  Schelling. 


^    i 


'/ 


s 


I 


♦ 


» 


CHAPTER  IV. 


THE    TKI.EOI.OCICAL     PHASE     OF     SCHOFEMIAUER  S     DOCTRINE. 


10. 


T 


HE  relation  of  teleoloaieal  imiiianenee  niav 
be  considered  as  the  final  form  iiiuler  v  liich 
8chc)i)enhaiier  attempts  to  conceive  tlie  con- 
nection l)etween  the  will  and  the  world.  We  have 
seen  that  his  previous  notions  of  this  connection  ha^'e 
not  led  to  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  problem  which 
he  essays  to  solve.  Schopenhauer,  in  so  far  as  he  succeeds 
in  joining  noumena  with  phenomena,  proceeding  from  his 
conception  of  parallelism  between  the  inner  and  the  outer 
series,  makes  use  of  the  causal  law,  which  he  likewise  em- 
ploys in  his  doctrine  of  empirical  and  intelligible  character. 
Yet  in  these  tAvo  instances  we  have  found  him  dealing  with 
a  i)henomenal  rather  than  a  noumenal  will.  The  same  is 
also  true,  when  by  the  aid  of  the  teleological  concept,  he 
becomes  the  expounder  of  the  philosophy  of  immanence. 
In  fact  Schopenhauer,  following  Kant,  has  in  no  way  suc- 
ceeded in  reaching  a  transcendent  principle,  a  positive 
thing-in-itself.  The  will  under  all  points  of  view  appears 
w^hen  carefully  examined  as  a  multiplicity,  subjected  to 
space,  time  and  causality.  When  it  is  spoken  of  as  the 
final  reality  of  the  universe  it  is  another  principle  and  not 
the  wdi  which  is  leally  referred  to.  This  other  principle 
raises  itself  above  the  will  and  opposes  itself  to  it.  ' '  In 
truth  what  gives  to  our  life  its  strange  and  ambiguous  char- 
acter is  the  fact  that  in  it  kvo  diametrically  opposed  aims 
continually  conflict  with  each  other,  that  of  the  individual 
will   directed   toward  chimerical  fortune  in  an  ephemeral, 


i 


i 


64 


65 


dreamlike,  deceptive  being,  where  in  reference  to  what  has 
past  fortune  and  miKsfortune  are  of  equal  importance,  where 
the  present,  however,  at  every  moment  l)ecomes  the  past; 
and  that  of  Fate^  evidently  directed  toward  the  destroying 
of  our  fortune  and  therebv  toward  the  mortification  of  our 
will  and  the  removal  of  the  delusion  which  holds  us  chained 
in  the  bonds  of  this  world."  (11-735.)  The  })rescnce  of 
this  second  and  tinal  princii)le  is  likewise  recognized  by 
Schopenhauer  in  the  fact  that  the  identity  of  all  liuman  l)e- 
ings  is  conceived  as  depending  on  the  denial  of  the  will  and 
not  on  its  afhrmation.  It  is  only  when  the  will  is  destroyed 
that  the  cause  of  diversity  in  the  world  disa})pears.  ''This 
identity  is,  however,  present  only  in  the  condition  of  the 
devial  of  the  will  (Nirvana)  since  its  atlirmation  (Sansara) 
has  for  its  form  the  phenomena  of  the  same  in  their  mul- 
tiplicity"  (11-700.) 

It  is  this  second  principle  whicli  determines  the  arrange- 
ment of  Schopenhauer's  world  of  ideas  and  which  becomes 
their  aim  and  goal.  Under  this  higher  reality  the  world  is 
conceived  as^  progressing  toward  man  and  intellectual  exis- 
tence, just  as  with  Aristotle.  The  ideas  which  find  their 
expression  in  the  world  are  not  nmtually  independent  but 
arranged  according  to  a  system  of  transcendental  valuation 
whose  goal  is  not  in  this  world.  The  will  on  the  other  hand 
is  reduced  to  the  position  of  demiurge,  the  creator  of  the 
present  world.  It,  therefore,  becomes  the  source  of  illusion 
and  not  the  intellect,  which  intuitivelv  recoirnizes  the  error 
of  earthly  existence  and  destroys  the  will  wh.ch  gave  it 
birth.  The  purely  secondary  character  of  the  will  can  no 
longer  be  doubted.  '' Behind  our  being  ^h^^:Q  \^  soinetldng 
{Etwas)  different,"  so  different  indeed  that  it  is  possible  that 
our  nature  from  its  very  foundation  may  become  something 


t 


I        I       I 


else  and  a  '^  transcendental  change  "  take  plact^.  This  tran- 
scendental chancre  is  the  end  of  existence  and  toward  this  all 
nature  moves  through  its  countless  gradations,  from  the 
senseless  forms  of  matter  to  the  religious  genius  who  reads 
the  meaning  of  life  and  comprehends  its  delusion.  It  now 
becomes  plain  why  it  is  that  Schopenhauer  pictures  the  ideas 
as  arranged  in  an  ascending  scale  whose  end  is  knowledge  ; 
for  the  will  ''can  be  removed  through  nothing  else,  than 
through  knowledge.  Therefore  the  only  way  to  salvation  is 
this,  that  the  will  should  appear  unopposed,  in  order  that  in 
this  appearance  it  may  recognize  its  own  being.  Only  in 
consequence  of  this  knowledge  can  the  will  remove  itself, 
and  therewith  likewise  end  the  suffering  which  is  inseparable 
from  its  appearance  :  this  is  not,  however,  possible  through 
(the  use  of)  physical  force,  as  through  destruction  of  the 
germ,  or  the  killing  of  the  new-born,  or  suicide.  Nature 
leads  the  will  to  the  light,  because  it  can  find  its  deliverance 
alone  in  the  light  "  (1-474).  Thus  the  relation  of  the  world 
to  this  superior  principle  becomes  beyond  a  doubt  a  pur- 
posive one,  but  what  this  ultimate  is  Schopenhauer  does  not 
attempt  te  definitely  set  forth.  "What  remains  after  the 
complete  removal  of  the  will  is  for  those  who  are  yet  full  of 
will,  indeed,  nothing.  However,  on  the  other  hand,  for 
those  in  whom  the  will  has  transformed  and  denied  itself  is 
this  our  so  real  world  with  all  its  suns  and  milky  ways — 
nothing  "  (1-487).  As  long  as  we  are  the  will  to  live,  that 
which  is  beyond  the  will  is  for  us  nothing  and  from  this  it 
follows,  since  knowledge  arises  alone  with  the  will,  that  the 
ultimate  principle  of  the  universe  is  unknowable.  Here 
Schopenhauer  is  once  more  true  to  his  Kantian  epistem- 
ology.  After  finding  the  will  to  be  a  purely  immanent 
principle  in  his  doctrine  of  the  ideas  as  revealing  and  express^ 


? 


s 


^ 


( 


66 


incy  themselves  in  the  world  of  sense,  Schopenhauer  discovers 
that  it  is  impossible  longer  to  consider  such  a  phenomenized 
and  relative  principle  as  the  true  thing-in-ilself.  The  real 
behind  all  change  and  beyond  the  possibility  of  phenomeni- 
zation  is  the  purely  limitative  and  negative  concei)t  under 
which  Kant  conceives  the  thing-in-itself.  Yet  for  the  mind 
to  set  up  limits  means  that  in  a  certain  sense  these  limits 
must  be  transcended,  and  so  in  Scho})enhauer's  treatment  of 
the  phenomenal  world  in  relation  to  this  newly  promulgated 
thing-in-itself,  an  idea  of  this  absolute  must  be  shadowed 
forth,  even  though  most  vaguely.  This  turn  in  Schopen- 
hauer's thought  leads  us  directly  to  his  religious  mysticism 
and  his  connection  with  the  philosophy  of  Fichte. 

11.]  Schopenhauer's  avowed  contemi)t  for  the  idealism  of 
successors  of  Kant  did  not  entirely  free  him  from  the  spirit 
of  his  times,  and  we  find  here  and  there  i)assages  by  no 
means  repugnant  to  the  doctrine  of  Hegel;  while  in  his 
teaching  concernino-  the  irrational  element  at  the  l)asis  of  the 
world  and  in  his  treatment  of  natural  philosophy  there  is 
much  which  reminds  one  of  the  poetic  and  extravagant  ex- 
position of  Schelling;  but  of  the  three  great  apostles  of  the 
Idealistic  School,  his  relation  to  its  founder  is  the  most  im- 
portant for  the  pur[)oses  of  this  discussion.  Clearly  the 
point  at  which  Schopenhauer  enters  into  the  closest  connec- 
tion with  Fichte  is  in  his  construction  of  metaphysics  from 
an  ethical  and  religious  basis  with  the  necessary  theological 
presuppositions  as  to  the  relation  of  the  world  to  its  ultimate 
principle.  This  i)rinciple  is  for  Fichte  the  Universal  Ego, 
for  Schopenhauer  at  tirst  the  will,  l)ut  later  an  unknown 
and  unknowable  "  Etivas.''  Fichte  conceives  philosophy  as 
founded  on  morals,  and  the  order  of  the  universe  is  an  ethi- 
cal order  continually  expressing  itself  with  greater  perfec- 


♦ 


\ 


I 


67 


tion.  Thus  far  Fichte's  philosophy  is  purely  immanent  and 
unreservedly  optimistic  in  marked  contrast  to  Schopenhauer's 
system  which  finds  the  world  the  worst  possible,  so  full  of 
pain  and  evil  that  were  it  but  a  little  worse  it  could  not 
exist.  Yet  even  for  Schopenhauer  the  world  offers  an  oppor- 
tunity for  the  exercise  of  morality,  since  all  beings  are 
called  upon  to  minimize  the  suffering  around  them  by  the 
limitation  of  their  own  personal  wills,  the  source  of  all  evil. 
When  Fichte \s  philosophy  bee  )mes  transcendant  and  assumes 
a  distinctively  religious  character  it  enters  into  a  much  closer 
accord  with  Schopenhauer's  system.  Here  there  is  no  great 
difference  between  the  ''Incomprehensible  One  "  of  Fichte 
and  the  Etwm  of  Schopenhauer.  They  approach  very  near 
to  the  Kantian  thing-in-itself  and  are  negative  concepts. 
The  absolute  Ego  is  inexplicable  and  incomprehensible  to 
finite  minds.  In  itself  it  is  neither  subject  nor  object  ;  it 
tirst  l)ecomes  known  ])y  its  separation  into  these  antithetical 
elements.  In  essence  it  is  the  pure,  white  light  which  is 
never  known  in  its  purity.  Schopenhauer  at  this  point  must 
he  interpreted  as  in  intimate  agreement  with  Fichte.  The 
will  like  the  Ei^o  is  in  the  first  instance  a  psvcholooficallv 
known  fact.  It  is  employed  to  denominate  the  thing-in- 
itself,  yet  the  a!)solute  as  such  reseml)les  in  name  alone  its 
alleged  counterpart.  The  will  like  the  Ego  belongs  entirely 
to  the  phenomenal  world  ;  as  without  the  NonEjro  the  E^o 
cannot  be  conceived,  so  without  the  world  the  will  falls 
away.  The  ultimate  behind  the  manifold  is  an  enigma,  since 
it  is  irrational  in  so  far  as  with  the  renunciation  of  the  will, 
the  intellect,  which  has  fulfilled  the  j)urpose  for  which  it  was 
created,  is  removed.  Subject  and  object  fade  away  in  the 
eternal  nio^ht  which  broods  over  all. 

For  Fichte,  however,  the  absolute  Ego  cannot  be  regarded 


t 


i 


(T8 


without  certain  determinations,  in  as  much  as  its  relation  to 
the  world  must  be  conceived  as  the  foundation  of  moralit}'. 
It   cannot   be   explained,  perhaps,    why   the    eternal    being 
divides  itself  into  subject  and  object  since  its  freedom  is  be- 
yond comprehension,  yet  it  must  stand  in    a    teleological  re- 
lation to  its  phenomena  and  cannot  be  regarded   in  itself  as 
irrational.     Further,  it  becomes  the  end  of  religious  striv- 
ing, and  though  it  approximates  to  a  nothing  for  knowledge, 
for  faith  it  may  become  everything,  as  the  history  of   nega- 
tive theology  from  Philo  to  the  present  day  shows.    "Man," 
Fichte  tells  us,    "must  do    away   with  himself  as  the  great 
negation  and  then  he  passes  into  God. ' '     This  is  the  goal  of 
life  and  this  is   the  final   mystitication  of   Fichte' s  system. 
How   near   this   teaching  is  to  the  ultimate  philosophy  of 
Schopenhauer,  as  expressed  in  the  closing  chapters  of  the 
World  as  Will  and  Idea,  a  rapid  survey  will  show.     Scho- 
penhauer's negative   must   not  be   conceived   as  a  nothing. 
"  If  something  is  nothing   among   all  that  which  we  know, 
so  is  it,  indeed,  for  us  completely  nothing.     Yet  it  does  not 
follow  from  this  that  it   is  absolutely  nothino',  that  it  also 
viewed  from  every  possible  standpoint  and  in  every  possible 
sense   must  b  e  nothing,    but  only  that  we  are  limited  to  a 
purely  negative  knowledge  of  the   same,  which  very   well 
can  arise  from  the  limitations  of  our  standpoint"   (11-703.) 
This  relative  nothing   has   a    decided   moral   relation  to  the 
world.      Life  is  a  punishment  and  an  atonement  for  the  origi- 
nal sin  implicit  in  all  living.      "  Man's  greatest  crime  is  that 
he  was  born."     This  existence  then  is  not  simply  a  mistake, 
not  simply  something  that  brings  more  sorrow  than  hapi)i- 
ness,  not  simply  the  epitome  of  pain  ;  it  is  morally  wrong, 
and  therefore  must  be  conceived   in  opposition  to  a  higher 
principle  which  rules  the  universe,  demanding  a  strict  account 


I 


t    m 


■>        r 


69 


for  the  sin  of  humanitv.      "  The  world  is  exactlv  what  it  is, 
because  the  will,  whose  appearance  it  is,  is   such,  because  it 
so    wills.     The   justification   for   the  suffering  is   that   the 
will  affirms  itself  in  this  appearance   and  this  affirmation  is 
justified   and  atoned  for  through  the  fact  that  it  bears  the 
sufiering.     Here  is  revealed  to  us  a  glimpse  of  eternal  jus- 
tice.^''    (1-390.)      This  higher  principle  is    not   conceived 
alone   under   moral  attributes.      The   world   while  ethically 
wrong,  is   yet   the  scene  for   the   working   out  of  salvation. 
Man  is  the  crown  of  creation  because  in  him  is  the  possibil- 
ity of  escaping  from   temporal   existence.      Here  is  the  dis- 
tinctive religious  side   to   Schopenhauer's  doctrine  and  here 
he  is  in   accord   with  Fichte  and   Neo-Platonic  mvsticisni. 
"  Should  yet  a  positive  knowledge  be  insisted  upon  concern- 
ing   that    which    philosophy  can  exy^ress  only  negatively  as 
denial  of  the  will,  then  there  is  nothing  left  but  to  point  out 
that  condition  which  those  have  reached  who  have  experi- 
enced a  complete   denial  of  the   will,  and  which  is  indicated 
by  the   name  ecstacy,    rapture  [Entruckung^)  illumination, 
union    with    God,    etc. ;    which   condition,    however,    is  not 
really  to  Ije   called  knowledge,  because  it  has  no  longer  the 
form  of  subject  and  object,  and  because  further  it  is  accessi- 
ble only  to  individual  experience  and   cannot  be  communi- 
cated to  others."  (1-485.)     "Life  presents  itself  as  a  pro- 
cess of  purification  whose  cleansing  lye    is   pain.     If   the 
process  is  completed,  it  leaves  its  previous  immorality  and 
wickedness  as  a  shell  behind  and  then  comes  that  condition 
of  which  the  Veda  says  :    findltur  nodus  cordis,  dissfdvim- 
tur  omnesdidjitationes,  ejusque  opera  evaneseunt.'^  (II  735. ) 
Thus  Schopenhauer's  philosophy  passes  over  into  religious 
mysticism.     The  final  principle  of  the  universe  is  no  longer 
a  matter  of  knowledge.     Its  essence  and  its  relation  to  the 


*-"l—W       ^^B*- 


70 


world  are  discernable  to  the  eye  of  faith  alone.  Yet  this 
much  is  certaiiL  The  aim  of  all  things  animate  and  inani- 
mate is  reabsorjion  into  the  infinite  from  which  it  has  pro- 
ceeded. Schopenhauer  agrees  most  fully  with  Meister 
Eckhard  and  the  mystics  of  the  Christian  faith,  hut  especially 
he  is  in  accord  with  the  religious  teachings  of  the  Orient, 
whose  theme  is  the  nothingness  of  life,  whose  goal  is  Nir- 
vana. 

"  The  dew  is  on  tho  lotus :  rise  Great  Sun  ! 

*'  And  lift  my  leaf  and  mix  me  with  the  wave, 

''  Om  mani  padmc  hum,  the  sunrise  comes! 

^'  The  dewdrop  slips  into  the  shining  sea.''* 
12.]  In  order  to  understand  the  worth  and  si<rni(icancc  of 
Schopenhauer's  i)hilos()[)hy  itis  most  imi)()rtant  from  the  out- 
set to  determine  the  point  of  view  from  which  it  is  to  he 
considered,  and  in  this  connection  it  is  necessary  first  of  all 
clearly  to  grasp  the  fact  that  the  system  which  is  presented 
to  us  is  by  no  means  a  unity  wlicn  treated  as  a  metaphysical 
doctrine.  Here  it  1)reaks  down  completely  and  here  is  seen 
the  impossibility  of  grounding  a  transcendental  }>lnl()S()pliy 
on  the  Kantian  epistemology.  The  negative  importance  of 
this  part  of  Sch()i)enliauer\s  philosophy  is  notewortliy  in  con- 
nection with  Kant's  teaching,  since  the  founder  of  the  (  j-itical 
Philosophy  did  not  journey  beyond  the  island  of  experience. 
Schopenhauer,  however,  ventures  out  on  the  ^'wi<lc  and 
stormy  ocean,  the  region  of  illusion,  where  many  a  fogbank, 
many  an  iceberg,  seems  to  themariiur  on  his  \()\ao:c('f  <lis- 
covery  a  new  country/'  4-  ()n  this  ocean  Schopenhauer's 
adventurous  bark  wanders  iip  and  down,  but  e\er  an<l  ancui 
returns  to  the  kM  faniibar  co:ist,  having  found  no  continent 
beyond. 

*  The  Light  of  Asia  ;   Sir  I'Mwin  An-oli.  lA'tul.n  iH^^k 
t  Criticjuc  of  Pure  ReastHi  ,  Transcendental    Doctnne  of  Uic  I'aenltv 
Judgriieut,    Chapter  111. 


« 


71 


The  Kantian  doctrine,  however,  is  but  one  side  of  Schopen- 
hauer's philosophy.      The  doctrine  of  the  id. as  must  not  be 
forgotten  although  the  system  under   consideration  is  thus 
divided  into  two  opposing  lines  of  thought  which  are  never 
reconciled.      The    world    drama    has    no    unity  of  plot,    but 
moves  forward    under  the    influence    of   two    diametricadly 
oi)posed  forces  and  the  denouement  must  be  found  on  a  stage 
not  presented  to  human  view.      It  is  a  transcendental  climax 
which  we  must  seek  if  we  wish  to  find   even   a  modicum  of 
consistency  in  the  system  of  Schopenhauer.      Otherwise  all 
remains    frao^mentarv    and    unsatisfactory.       Lehmann    has 
hinted  at  the   point  of  view  which  must  be  assumed  if  these 
heterofreneous     fragments    are     to    ])e     brought     together. 
''  What  holds  these  elements  together,"  he  writes,  "])rea+Jies 
life  into  them,    binds  them  into  an  organic  whole,  is  a  unity 
at    the    basis    of   which    lies  a  inoral  ordering  of  things. 
This  conception  of  a  moral  world  orders  merges,   however, 
into  a  relio-ious  determination  of  the  universe  which  must  be 
considered  as  the  final  standpoint  from  which  Schopenhauer's 
philosophy  is  to  be  treated.      Meta})hysics  nmst  yield   jibtce 
to  a  })hiloso})hy  of  ethics  and   religion,    if  meaning  is  to  l>e 
extracted  from  a  doctrine  which  is  otherwise  not   even   ci  n- 
sistentlv   inconsistent       Such   an   interpretation   of  tlie  ]ibil- 
o-ophv  l)ef()re  us  is  })y  no  means  forced  or  far   fetclied.    hut 
is  in  the  closest  accord  with  the  evident  meaning  of  Scho})en- 
hauer  himself.      As  Kuno  Fischer  has  clearly  ])ointed  (uit.  it 
was  no  mere  whim   which  induced  the  })hiloso])her  to  in-tall 
the  statue  of  Buddha  in  the  |)lace  of  honor  in  his  household, 
and  wdiich  |n'oni])ted  him  to  salute  the  iMdefaligahlo  Fraueii- 
stadt  as  -  l^r::-  Ernnq.lint^^  and  his  con  verts  as  '•  Apostles. 
Schopenhauer  was  deeply  in  earnest.      lie   repirde^d    liiniself 
as  the  prtanulgator  of  a  new  inoralh}-  mij»!   a>  tiie  heralder  ot 
a  new  sahation. 


f 


<  •■■» 


Scti()[)enhau('r  must  be  credited  with  a  keen  insight  into 
the  essence  of  ethics  and  religion.  Two  of  his  <loctrines  are 
especially  noteworthy,  the  one  that  of  the  unethical  nature 
of  the  i)urelv  individual  will  and  the  necc.-^sity  of  its  denial 
for  the  sake  of  true  morals  nn<\  religion  :  the  otlier  that  of 
the  mystical  nature  of  the  tinal  ])rinci|)le  of  religious  viaiera- 
tion.  Here  we  are  no  longer  to  consider  the  will  as  thing- 
in-itself  !)ut  as  the  source  of  sorrow  and  misery  in  the  world. 
The  i)ersonal  will  directed  toward  the  attainment  of  its  own 
desires  must  l)e  reirarded  hv  reliirion  and  ethics  alike  as 
iniw^orthy  ;  and  since  Schopenhauer's  coiirc|)tion  of  the  will 
is  contined  |)urely  to  its  ind.\  idtial  mnnifestnt ions  and  recog- 
nizes no  universal  tendencies  in  its  natui'c  it  folhc^v-s  that 
this  will  nnist  he  denied  and  crucjlicd.  Here  Scliopen- 
hauer  gives  emplia>i>  to  a  most  ini|)oida!!t  trutii,  a  truth 
wliich  the  optimism  of  \n^  time  \va<  in  'lann-i^r  of  tnrircUing. 
Salvation  comes  alone  with  the  di\atli  of  ths'  evil  will,  \vlio'<(^ 
destruction  all  religicsn  mu^t  seek.  Only  in  the  liiial  illu- 
mination of  the  traji-cendenl  worM  is  re.-l  reaelied.  and  tlu.' 
door  of  eternal  peace  ()|>en(Ml.  Urns  Schopenhauer  is  in 
svmpatliy  with  the  tea'/liiiii'-  of  the  irreat  AuLi-u-line,  who 
likewise  stronirlv  assert.-  the  -pririiarv  i'.f  tlie  will  at  the  out- 
set,  l)ut  wdio  ends  in  pla<'inii-  tlie  \-i-inn  of  (ind  a^  \\ir  tlnal 
aim  of  all  stri\'inir.  d'h*'re  is  ca.lin  aftor  the  str.rni.  So 
Augustine,  like  Schopc'ihaner,  iind>  the  end  of  all  (aaleavnr 
in  Neo-Fla,tonic  mysticism  vdiose  S|iifi!  llimuLiii  reiituiao  of 
formalism  and  spii'itual  decay  ke|)t  adive  The  t!aio  religaai  in 
the  Church.  Tims,  \'it,'\vir!L!' ^eh,(!pia!h;uie!-'>  ph'i!o-.(>|!.hy  frren 
the  standpoint  of  ethics  and  i-eligion  it  ohtaiie-  a  worth 
which  it  cannot  claim  as  a  pure  metaj-'h}  <ie>.  Here  tin.' 
tangled  threads  of  Schopenhauer'.s  liieaighl  iiecume  separated, 


•  I 


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« 


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liere  the  heterogenous  elements  find  a  union  and  a  meaning, 
when  the  world  is  viewed  as  |)rogressing  toward  a  goal 
wdiich,  though  no  human  eye  can  see  and  no  finite  mind  can 
know,  the  heart  can  feel  and  compreliend. 


I 


Natus  sum  dlv'iv.  knl.  Apri,  MIX  \X;i.X  I  X,  I'hcnirc  in 
Khodiciisis  Insulae  ro-})uhlic;!.  St('|'hanus  (\.lvii>  opcrari- 
onim  fahricae  dux    patiu"    nicu^    e^l.        lldei    addielus    sum 

evaiiir^dicae. 

Septem  arinos  in    ludis    privatis    v{    dciiidi'    annos    ti'cs  in 

Academia  Worccstd"  studii.-^  iucuiiui. 

Anno  MDCCCLXA'Il  apud  riiiversitatnn  lii-uncn-cMu 
matric'ulatus  :  (inattuor  annis  in  studiis  artium  hoiu'>tarum 
consumptis  ad  i^-radiun  liacralaurt'i  pliilo.-^upliiat'  t'M'etus  sum. 
Trinus  postea  aiuiis  in  ctidcin  uiiivcrsitati^  iiradjim  artium 
nirunstri  onera  historiai'  litti'raruiii  .VuLiiiraiMun  vX  liuLniae 
})raeci[)iu'  data,  nu'ritus  sum.  l*rai'tt're:i  uuuni  aruiuiu  m 
universitate  i>runen^i  moratus  Jacoitum  Sclli  |>lnlr»-,op|tiao 
|)r()fess(»rem  \irum  humanis>!niuiii  audrvi. 

Amu)  MDCCX'XlA'  l)(u-(»iimun  iiu'  ■•ontuli  uhi  jU'()i\'.-ori - 
})us  chirissimis  I'aul.-t'n  v\  PlIridci-riM't  dn.-tnrc  Siinmrl  maL'"- 
isti'is  studiis  philosc.phiao  ojserain  da!'<Mn.  Ab  die  l^aN^•}lali 
MDCCCXCVI  Ari^i'iitorati  fui  cl  proU'-sore^  Knapj), 
Koeppcd,  Windelhand  el  Ziculei'  viio-.    ofiiatissimos    audivi. 

His  omnibus  mairislri-  uTatias  a^-o  tiiiafii  inaxinia--^. 


} 


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